Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction
to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis
Neil K. Komesart
When the Supreme Court decides whether the action of another branch of government is constitutionally valid, it is inevitably allocating institutional responsibility. Sometimes the presence
of this allocative choice is obvious; federalism or separation of
powers questions, for example, are cast explicitly as choices among
components of the political process. But the Court must make an
institutional choice even when it invalidates an action, not because
the action was taken by the wrong political body, but because it
was taken at all. Whenever a political decision is declared invalid,
the judgment of the judicial branch has been substituted for that
of other branches of government.
This article argues that constitutional law is best understood
and evaluated by giving central attention to this allocation of decisionmaking and, therefore, to the relative attributes of the alternative institutional decisionmakers. The article, in other words, proposes a comparative institutional approach to constitutional law.
The logic of the approach is simple. When the Court addresses
constitutional issues, it typically must choose a principal decisionmaker from among the various institutions of government, including the judiciary itself. Accordingly, it should, and to some extent does, consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of these
institutions to address the social issue involved. These institutions
differ from one another, and the force and implication of these differences vary from one type of social issue to another.
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pear regularly in cases and commentary. The judiciary is relatively
good at deciding issues of procedure and plays a relatively active
role in such decisions. It is relatively poor at deciding issues of war
and foreign affairs and entrusts these decisions largely to Congress
and the President. It finds legislatures-state and federal-suspect
when they pass legislation that disproportionately harms politically weak minorities or when they restrain activities that may affect the incumbency of the legislators themselves-such as voting,
political association, and speech.
But these points, although they make up the core of existing
institutional analysis, hardly scratch the surface. What should the
Court do when a case involves war and criminal procedure, or foreign relations and politically weak minorities or restraints on
speech and political association in time of war? Does concern
about traditional minorities or about suppression of political activity exhaust the list of serious sources of distrust of the legislative
process? Not only may the same case present the Court with substantive issues it feels comfortable addressing and ones it does not,
but the sources of distrust of governmental processes also may
vary in kind and degree across cases, as does the relative competence of the judiciary. The Court must decide whether and to what
extent these potential defects balance in favor of the political
branches or the judiciary and must allocate responsiblity
accordingly.
The comparative institutional analysis I envisage has three
fundamental features, which can be set out here and explored as
the article proceeds:
(1) Courts and legislatures differ in their capacities to
solve substantive questions, and the degree and kind of these
differences can vary significantly.
(2) The relative difficulty of various substantive questions
arises from social and political realities too varied and subtle
to be adequately captured in the broad analytical categories,
such as substance and process or principle and policy, employed by many constitutional scholars. In general, such simple bifurcations are inferior to an approach that can more naturally accommodate the gradations in and interplay among
these underlying factors.
(3) Although a role for courts in our constitutional system
might be based on the identification of flaws in the legislative
process, thereby overcoming the presumption of constitutionality traditionally accorded the more democratic institutions,
identification of a legislative flaw should not be conclusive; the

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:366

analysis must be comparative. The legislature has defects and
advantages relative to the judiciary. Whether and to what extent the court takes the decision from the legislature should
reflect this reality.
The approach offered here can be used for both descriptive or
positive, and prescriptive or normative, purposes.1 Lawyers defending clients who have been harmed by the action of the government
are interested principally in the former. They want to know the
extent to which the courts will provide protection for their clients-the likelihood that the courts will invalidate the governmental action-and they want to know what factors, when emphasized,
will increase that likelihood. The scholars whose perceptions of institutional analysis are considered here are interested principally
in the latter. They wish to know whether the courts' decisions are
correct and how they might be changed for the better. This article
argues that institutional considerations play a central role in constitutional decisions and that they should be a central feature of
any analysis of constitutional law whether descriptive or
prescriptive.
It should not be supposed, however, that the analysis I propose is straightforward or obvious. Because we lack a well-developed discipline of comparative institutional analysis, it is difficult
to determine which factors are important and which balance
among them is appropriate in a given setting. The social sciences
literature includes many studies of institutions that are efforts at
comparative institutional analysis and, thus, provide theoretical insight.2 Similarly, the insights, intuitions, and impressions of law1 For a consideration of the goals of legal analysis identified by terms such as "positive"
and "normative," see Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A
Comparative InstitutionalAlternative, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1354-56 (1981).
2 In political science, there are examples of extensive inquiry into institutions. These
include such works as Leonard White's examination of the history of the federal executive
departments, see L. WHrT, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINisTRATmv HISTORY, 17891801 (1948); L. WaTE, THE JEFFERSoNIANs: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1801-1829
(1951); L. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1829-1861 (1954);
L. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: A STUDY IN ADmNSTRATIVE HISTORY, 1869-1901 (1958), and
Theodore Lowi's classic critique of pluralist theory, see T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM
(1969); see also R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE (1953). The
legal historians Lawrence Friedman and Willard Hurst have examined the evolution of the
law through its institutional features. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973);
J.W. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (1982) [hereinafter cited as J.W. HURST, STATUTES];
J.W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950). Willard Hurst's Dealing With Statutes
attempts to understand the legislative process by emphasizing its distinct institutional character. J.W. HURST, STATUTES, supra, at 2-8. Economists have also offered theoretical insights
about institutions-even nonmarket ones. For a summary of economic analysis of public
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yers, judges, and legal scholars provide rich information. The challenge remains to construct an analytical framework that can
integrate the two. While even the simple institutional analysis we
can muster at present provides important insights, the primitive
nature of our analytical tools makes them as yet inadequate to
mine fully the complexity and richness of institutional choice.3
My purpose in this article is to promote an intellectual paradigm useful in organizing and ordering the vast range of potential
considerations that confront the student of constitutional law. I
show that the paradigm provides valuable insights about important
cases and issues, and that failure to employ it fully has left significant gaps in prominent constitutional theories. I hope that the applications presented here and my critique of other approaches
combine to provide at least a strong case for the value of the paradigm's further refinement and testing-an enterprise I want to
convince others to join.
The first section of the article sketches the approach I propose
and provides examples of its application. The remainder provides a
critique of the way institutional comparison is treated in several
prominent existing approaches to constitutional law. I begin with
the approach of John Hart Ely, which emphasizes the role of malfunction in the democratic process as a means for determining the
proper scope of judicial review. I then turn to the approaches of
Harry Wellington and Michael Perry, whose institutional analyses
place heavy emphasis on the powers of judicial reasoning and neutrality. Finally, I consider the approaches of Laurence Tribe and
Raoul Berger, which deal with institutional analysis by limiting its
relevance.4
sector behavior, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC C oicE (1979).
3 The approach I suggest has a limit apart from the present inadequacy of the analytical tools. As I have pointed out elsewhere, a comparative institutional approach is, by its
nature, incomplete. Komesar, supra note 1, at 1353. It is not possible to perform a complete
analysis without establishing some conception of the goal or goals that the institutions are
to achieve. To use a rough metaphor, it is not possible to evaluate the choice of tools without knowing the task; a hammer is not always superior to a screwdriver. I shall argue in the
body of this article that an analysis based solely on such considerations is basically incomplete, but an analysis that denies any validity to such considerations is also incomplete.
It is my belief that a study of variation in institutional capacity will yield more by way
of description and explanation of constitutional decisionmaking than will a study of variation in goals or ideologies. That belief, of course, can be tested only in future applications.
In this article, I argue only that the institutional component plays an essential role in constitutional analysis.
' Although I make no claim to survey all existing approaches to constitutional law, one
omission deserves special note since it is a prominent example of institutional analysis. In
his work, JUDicIL REvimw AND THE NATIONAL PoLrrcAL PRocEss (1980), Dean Jesse Choper
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OVERVIEW OF THE COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

This section discusses the basic institutions of government
and the principal distinctions among them, and examines various
concepts of institutional malfunction. The discussion then turns to
a series of issues in constitutional law in an effort to suggest the
proper contours of a serious comparative institutional analysis; my
starting point in examining these issues is the political question
doctrine, which focuses on the limits of judicial competence. The
section concludes with an examination of a number of cases arising
in different contexts-cases in which the Court, in profound doubt
about the validity of action by the relevant political branch, has
been confronted simultaneously with the limits of judicial ability.
The issues of constitutional law I consider throughout this section,
are, for the most part, issues of human or individual rights. Because these issues are those most often debated by constitutional
theoreticians and, at the same time, those for which institutional
comparison initially appears least suitable, they provide a demanding arena in which to test the validity of a comparative institutional approach.

argues that the dynamics of the political processes themselves provide an adequate, albeit
imperfect, means for resolving most issues associated with federalism and separation of
powers and that the Supreme Court would be wise to turn its attention and resources away
from these issues and toward individual rights. See J. CHOPER, JUDILCAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 169-70 (1980).
Choper's admirable concern for the workings of the political process, his rich descriptions of that process, and his recognition of the central importance of allocating scarce judicial resources reveal a basic emphasis on institutional attributes. But he leaves the knottiest
institutional issues in constitutional law untouched. Although he calls for a greater allocation of judicial resources to the issues of individual rights, he gives us little conceptual guidance on how to determine which social questions are to be addressed by the judiciary as
issues of individual rights and to what extent. All legislation or public sector action affects
individuals, and virtually all such activity affects some individuals detrimentally.
A court advised to turn from federalism and separation of powers to individual rights
will still be left to face the most basic and difficult institutional questions. It must still
determine which of the vast range of social issues will receive its attention and, more importantly, the degree of that attention. Indeed, given the number of instances in which it is
likely that severe distrust of the political process will be accompanied by strains on judicial
ability, federalism and separation of powers may often be optimal albeit indirect methods of
dealing with individual rights issues. Thus, the judiciary, faced with the quandary of severe
distrust of the political process and severe discomfort with its own abilities, may move to
intermediate solutions that involve the search for the least bad political actors or a delay
followed by redecision by another political entity. See infra note 30; text accompanying
notes 31-33. These solutions often have the distinct flavor of federalism or separation of
powers.
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A. The Basic Institutions
For my purposes, the primary institutional distinction to be

made is between the judiciary and the political branches 5 of gov-

ernment that produce the state action under review.$ Perhaps the
most important difference between the political branches and the
federal judiciary is in the job security of the principal decisionmakers. Federal judges have life tenure.7 Legislators and executives serve for shorter terms, ranging from two to six years at the
federal level." Legislators and executives interested in retaining office must be attuned to the desires of at least the politically active
voters in their districts. Judges, by contrast, need not.
The decisional structure of the political branches also differs
significantly from that of the courts. The political branches, for example, have significantly greater flexibility in determining the
agenda of social issues they will address.9 Courts can only address
' The term "political branches" is used throughout this article as a short-hand for the
non-judicial branches of government that produce the official action reviewed by the judiciary. Use of the term "political branches" is not meant to signify either that the judiciary is
not a branch of government or that it is completely divorced from all political considerations. It is a commonly used term, employed here for expositional convenience.
6 We shall subsequently see that this distinction begins to break down in cases where a
judiciary, facing strains on its own capacity, aligns itself with one or another of the political
branches in the resolution of a particular issue. For a discussion of one such case, see the
analysis of Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. The broad distinction suggested here, however, provides a valid starting point.
' Life tenure is granted to federal article M judges. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("Judges
.. . shall hold their Offices during good Behavior ...
"). Federal administrative judges
have shorter terms determined by statute. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7443(e) (15-year term for
Tax Court judges). The terms of state supreme court judges vary with jurisdictions from a
high of 14 years in New York, see N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2, to a low of 6 years in Alabama, see
ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 158. State trial court judges generally serve four to six year terms.
See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 10 (six-year term); OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 8(a) (four-year term).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I,

§2

(congressmen serve two-year terms), §3 (senators serve six-year

terms), art. II, § 1 (president serves four-year term).
9 This flexibility may vary-at least formally-within the political branches. On the
subject of the broad jurisdiction of the legislature, Willard Hurst offers the following
comment:
The country's separation of powers tradition assigns an open-door policy to the legislative function. With only narrow exceptions any party may bring any subject into the
legislative arena.
This distinctive breadth of legislative jurisdiction stands out by contrast with the
limits our tradition has set on approaching other agencies. However broad in total impact, executive or administrative lawmaking depends on statutory delegations which
specialize the parties and subject matter with which such agencies may deal. Lawmaking by judges is hedged in by doctrines of standing, justiciability, and precedent. But
no formal barriers of standing limit access to a legislature. Anyone who can persuade a
legislator to introduce a bill can cause the matter of his concern to be put into the
legislative machinery. Generally the legislature is free to make its own judgments of
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social issues brought to them by litigants. The political branches
also have more flexibility and resources to investigate the social
issues they address. In an adversarial judicial system, the litigants
are the primary sources of information, and courts are largely limited to information provided by advocates. Further, the courts face
formal restrictions on the disposition of issues brought before
them. They cannot, without justification, ignore a matter properly
before them; the legislature and executive can. A court's agenda
and the amount of attention it must give to an issue are also affected by the willingness or reluctance of litigants to settle the
given case.
These differences in flexibility and scope are related to and
underscored by a power traditionally held by the legislature-the
power to spend. By the exercise of this power, legislatures control
the operational scale of all branches of government, including the
judiciary. On the federal level, Congress can and has increased significantly the scale of both the legislative and the executive
processes. A vast array of agencies, bureaus, commissions, committees, and staffs is now responsible to the Congress or the President.
These entities aid in making government policy or make it directly
themselves. There has been no comparable increase in spending on
the federal judiciary, leading to a substantial divergence between
the relative expenditures on the federal judiciary and on the political branches.10

what matters are suitable for legislative consideration. And the novelty of a proposal
for legislation, or the fact that it will change prior common or statute law, raises no
legal barrier to its adoption.
J.W. HURST, STATUTES, supra note 2, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted).
10 In 1980 the total expenditure on the federal judiciary was about $564 million. See
FISCAL SERVICE, BUtRAu OF GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAsUtY, Doc. No. 3281, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPrs, EXPENDITURES AND BALANCES o
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 U.S. AccoUNTs]. While
the statements of accounts in 1980 U.S. AccouNTs make it difficult to calculate administrative costs for Congress, the executive, and the federal administrative agencies, a careful estimate yields a figure in excess of $94 billion-over 160 times the budget for the judiciary. See
id. at 110-24, 132-508. In 1925, the analogous figures were approximately $19 million for the
judiciary, see DIVISION OF BOOKKEEPING AND WARRANTS, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Doc. No.
2966, COMBINED STATEMENT OF THE RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS BALANCES, ETC. OF THE
UNITED STATES 131 (1925) [hereinafter cited as 1925 U.S. ACCOUNTS], and $424 million for
the political branches, see id. at 40-253, the latter less than 23 times the size of the former.
In other words, the administrative budget of the political branches had grown more than
seven times as fast as the budget of the judiciary.
Although the most dramatic source of the difference is the growth in administrative
agency budgets, compare 1980 U.S. ACCOUNTS, supra, at 140-502, with 1925 U.S. ACCOUNTS,
supra, at 49-253, even the figures for Congress and the executive proper dwarf those for the
courts. In 1980, that figure was over $1.25 billion, or more than twice the judicial budget.
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These generalizations about important operational differences
between the judiciary and the political branches provide the
framework for analyzing constitutional issues and cases discussed
later in this section. Narrower, more intensive studies of particular
constitutional issues may call for consideration of other institutions or for a more detailed description of the attributes of these
institutions. The foregoing treatment, however, will suffice for present purposes.
B.

Political Malfunction and Judicial Competence

What features of the decisionmaking process of the political
branches-here called "defects" or "malfunctions"-cause or
should cause the courts to distrust the decisions of these
branches?11
There is no universally accepted definition of political malfunction, but it is possible to offer something of a taxonomy that
reflects and expands upon conceptions presented in the constitutional law literature. First, the ways in which the electorate is defined can give rise to distrust of legislative decisionmaking. Often,
the interests of a person or group are affected by legislation on
which that person or group has no formal say, no vote. Decisions
made by states and localities, for example, can affect people who
do not live in and, therefore, have no vote in that jurisdiction.
There may also be residents of a jurisdiction who have no vote at
all. For most of our history, women did not have the vote; blacks
brought to this nation as slaves did not have the vote on a formal
basis until several years after emancipation and were denied it in
See 1980 U.S. ACCOUNTS, supra, at 110-24, 132-38. In 1925, the budget for the federal judiciary was actually greater than the administrative budget for Congress and the executive by
approximately 30%. Compare 1925 U.S. ACCOUNTS, supra, at 131, with id. at 47-48. In the
55-year period, the budget for Congress and the Executive increased almost three times
faster than that of the judiciary.
" Beginning the case for judicial review with a search for defects in the political process is more than an expositional convenience. It is consistent with the traditional presumption that determinations of the public good made by the legislature are consitutionally valid,
because it envisions a need for some showing that there is a problem with the legislative
process before the courts consider invalidating the legislature's determination.
This presumption of constitutionality is as old as American constitutional review, see,
e.g., Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 851
(1981) (discussing Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800)), and has been rephrased and refurbished at several stages. In an article commonly viewed by constitutional
scholars as the beginning of modern constitutional theory, James Bradley Thayer reviewed
the meaning of the concept of the presumption of constitutionality and made it the cornerstone for his own theory of the role of judicial review. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893).
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practice long after that; minors and aliens do not now have the
vote. Thus, even if we were completely sanguine about the ability
of legislators to reflect the will of the voting public and were convinced that the public will necessarily defines the public good, a
system in which not all the public voted would remain problematic. 2 Of course, this conception of malfunction is a simplification.
Many who do not have the vote are represented indirectly by those
who do. We have usually assumed that the interests of children are
represented by concerned adult parents. On some matters, the interests of women may have been represented by voting
males-husbands, fathers, brothers and so on. Aliens may be represented by citizens who recall their own backgrounds and empathize with the aliens. Yet, whatever the qualifications, formal exclusion from the political process seems a likely source of distrust
that would and should attract the interest of a reviewing court.
Second, if the formal exclusion of certain groups from the political process can provide a basis for distrust of the legislative process, one need not take a large conceptual step to envision de facto
exclusions that can trigger similar reactions in reviewing courts.
Certain groups, enfranchised, nevertheless may have their interests
underrepresented in the legislative process.1 The classic examples
11 Throughout this article, I tend to equate representation of the desires of the populace with the social good. It is a convenient and frequently employed assumption though
quite obviously it is not universally accepted. The definition is consistent with a utilitarian
conception of good. It is also consistent with the Rawls's notion of public desires generated
in a neutral state, since a person in this neutral state would have incentives to decide what
is best for everyone because he himself might be anyone. See J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 164-66 (1971).
I do not, by virtue of this assumption, mean to subscribe to any particular definition of
the good. I only employ this assumption here to demonstrate the range of institutional questions raised by one common definition of the good. I develop the same theme for other
conceptions of the good infra text accompanying notes 187-99. As I have indicated elsewhere, better development of notions of social good would aid the development of the attendant institutional analyses. Komesar, supra note 1, at 1391. The outcomes of institutional analyses associated with existing conceptions of social good are, of course, subject to
change as we develop better conceptions of either institutions or social good.
13 If adequate representation is regarded as a means to the achievement of some social
goal, then the choice of goal will affect the assessment of the adequacy of the representation
or of defects in the political process in general. For example, if one were to focus on efficient
resource allocation as a social goal, one could identify specific corresponding imperfections
in the the political process that would impede its achievement. For a description of the
"public choice" literature of economics, wherein these imperfections are examined, see D.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHoIcE (1979). Elsewhere I have offered two polar models of political process and discussed their imperfections as a means for selecting among allocative preferences.
See Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER & N.
KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAw-AN ECONOWC AND INsTrruTIONAL ANALYsis 218, 221-23
(1978).
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of such groups recognized in modern constitutional law are racial,
ethnic, and religious minorities. In the famous footnote in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,1" the Court pointed to legislation
imposing distinct disadvantages on "discrete and insular minorities" as an instance in which the strong presumption of constitutionality might not apply. In subsequent decades, the Court has
shown special concern when legislation adversely affected racial,
ethnic, and religious minorities. The perceived mechanics of underrepresentation, like the term "discrete and insular," remain vague,
but it seems clear that concerns about political powerlessness play
a role in raising the Court's suspicions.
Third, though the formal exclusion of relevant interests and
the underrepresentation of traditional minorities are the most frequently cited examples of political malfunction, the judicial and
scholarly commentary reflects others as well. The Carolene Products footnote, for example, also expressed concern about legislative
attempts to control elements of the political process such as voting,
speech, and assembly. It has been suggested that such concern reflects the judiciary's suspicion that political incumbents might be
tempted to employ their offices to maximize their incumbency by
silencing and defusing opposition.15
Fourth, beyond the confines of modern constitutional commentary, there are other broad sources of distrust with significant
historical and theoretical pedigree. One notices, for example, worry
about the maltreatment of the majority by concentrated special interests. A long history of concern about the overrepresentation of
some minorities may, indeed, be as strong a part of our tradition as
is the concern about the underrepresentation of other minorities.1 6
And even within the confines of concern about minority underrepresentation, there lurks a broader sense of concern for the failure to represent adequately a numerical minority whose members
have very high stakes in the resolution of a particular question
against a numerical majority whose members have very low
stakes. 7

" 304 U.S. 144, 152 n°4 (1938). The text of the note appears infra note 143.

See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77 (1980). Whether and to what extent, this
desire by incumbents to perpetuate their incumbency actually constitutes a separate source
of political imperfection is considered infra note 141.
,1 I explore this theme and its pedigree in my discussion of Ely and the CaroleneProducts footnote infra notes 143-60 and accompanying text.
1 For a fuller examination of the problem of disproportionate stakes in the resolution
of a particular question, see Komesar, supra note 13, at 223-29. While this theme is most
often addressed in discussions premised on the contention that the prime social goal is the
'"
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This list is obviously neither complete nor precise. 18 More rigorous definition of political malfunction requires a simple and accepted conception of social good, or at least a better defined range
of such conceptions, that could then be employed to define a range
of potential political malfunctions. Although attempts to comb the
literature for such conceptions and to generate a series of political
models to fit them are best left for studies of specific areas of constitutional law, the sections that follow will expand upon this list
of political malfunctions and will attempt to specify their theoretical underpinnings.
No matter how complete our description of the set of political
malfunctions, however, we would still lack a complete institutional
basis for understanding and evaluating constitutional decisions. A
recognition that the political process is imperfect and at times severely so provides only one component of a thorough institutional
analysis. A court that normally harbors a strong presumption in
favor of legislative supremacy may be willing to reconsider that
presumption in the face of severe political malfunction, but it
would not and should not abandon the presumption unless in the
given setting it can offer an alternative superior to the defective
legislative process. In other words, the judiciary must consider its
own capacity for evaluating the social issue posed by the legislation
under review in a given case. For example, a court must consider
its "physical" resources-in particular, the number of available

promotion of total public welfare or the efficient allocation of resources, it might well have a
place when other social goals are viewed as preeminent. Both the analysis of special interests, which concerns the overrepresentation of concentrated minorities, and the analysis of
intensity bias, which concerns the underrepresentation of dispersed majorities, deserve
greater attention in the analysis of a wide variety of social goals. Again, the failure carefully
to define these goals handicaps the institutional analysts' attempts to suggest their institutional implications.
1S For example, some scholars have suggested that the legislative process may suffer
from a form of inertia that severely delays the repeal or amendment of legislation that is no
longer socially desirable. The "remand" function of judicial review suggested by Bickel and
Wellington appears to reflect this perception. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose
and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAv. L. Rxv. 1, 22-35 (1957). Bickel
further developed his analysis of the remand function of judicial review in A. BicmKEL, TH
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 165-66 (1962). Both the remand function and the problem of
legislative inertia play central positions in Calabresi's recent work on the role of the judiciary in statutory review. See G. CALsREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 120-24
(1982).
None of the authors spells out carefully his explanation for why the legislature is inert
in one instance and not in others. This legislative malfunction may, in fact, be no more than
a manifestation of others we have noted, such as the underrepresentation or overrepresentation of minorities. When, and to what extent, under- or over-representation may occur is
explored in Komesar, supra note 13, at 221-29.
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judges. Recently, a number of scholars have pointed out that this
century has seen an increase in the output of the legislative process.1 9 The political branches-legislative, executive and administrative-have grown immensely. The judiciary has not grown
nearly so much over the same period.2 0
Each claim of constitutional invalidity presents a different set
of demands on the resources of the judiciary. Cases will vary in the
number and complexity of judicial determinations needed for their
complete resolution. When the Court declares a right, it must face
the task of defining that right and the associated remedy. In some
instances, it can define the right in clear terms and offer a remedy
that involves little continuing judicial action. Other instances require the Court to define a right in general terms, and either clarify it gradually in future litigation or provide a remedy that involves continuing judicial supervision-even continuing appellate
supervision.
By way of illustration, we can compare the Court's decisions in
Roe v. Wade2" and Brown v. Board of Education.2 The first defined the right to seek an abortion. The second defined the right to
attend public schools without regard to race. Both cases involve
controversial instances of judicial intervention; yet, the two differ
in the Court's general approach to defining the rights and remedies
involved. In Roe, the Court spelled out the right to abortion in relatively specific terms. It split the period of pregnancy into trimesters and defined different rights for pregnant women and the state
in reference to the different trimesters.23 Violations of the rights
described were remedied by invalidating the offending restrictions.24 In Brown, the Court invalidated racial restrictions on
school attendance, 25 but it declined to specify the appropriate form
of remedy. 26 In subsequent cases, the Court has struggled in its
efforts to define the rights and remedies associated with school desegregation. 27 Its efforts have consistently produced standards re-

"9 See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, supra note 18, at 1-7; J.W. HURST, STATUTES, supra note 2, at

14 (1982).
20 See supra note 10.
21 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

23 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162-65.
2 See id. at 166.
26 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 495.
26 See id. at 495-96.
27 See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Goss v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 683 (1963).
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quiring a substantial continuing role for the lower federal courts.2 8
I am not suggesting that the abortion issue was better resolved
than the school desegregation issue because its resolution has
proven easier to administer. The reaction of some state and local
officials to the Brown decision showed a determination to obstruct
desegregation. The Court had strong basis to infer that racial segregation would be achieved by other means if the Court were
merely to invalidate the legislation that prohibited integration.
Neither am I suggesting that Brown was the more questionable decision because its implementation has required more judicial resources. The effect on judicial resources is only one of many considerations associated with the capacity of the judiciary, and the
judiciary is only one of the institutions to be considered.2 9 Rather,
I am arguing that, if we assume the remedies in Brown and Roe
were equally appropriate for their given settings, the school desegregation issue posed a much greater potential for requiring a continuing outlay of judicial resources and that this potentially greater
cost was a relevant consideration in the calculus of institutional
comparison. Had the Court's level of distrust of the legislative process not been so great, this consideration might have changed the
outcome in Brown.3 0
28 See, e.g., Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1971);

Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955).
29 The more specific remedy proposed in Roe is by no means ideal. The arbitrary nature
of the trimester approach has been criticized by both opponents and proponents of a broadbased constitutional right to abortion. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2508 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Lynn, Women's Reproductive
Rights, 7 WoMEN's LAW RPTR. 223, 226 (1982).
30 So brief a treatment of these important cases unfortunately risks misunderstanding.
That strain on judicial resources is an important consideration does not necessitate that the
judiciary would or should be less willing to provide active review of a political decision.
Faced with serious doubts about the political process, along with strains on its resources, the
Court might well respond with a sweeping declaration that all laws of a particular type are
invalid. Both sweeping validations and sweeping invalidations husband the Court's resources. I explore this theme further infra text accompanying notes 36-40.
In response to strains on its resources, the judiciary may also attempt innovative remedies such as looking for help from within the political process or seeking to replicate parts of
the political process through panels roughly representing the range of community interests.
I have come to call the former the "trusty buddy" approach. One can see it at work, for
example, in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 175 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring), where "considerable deference" is accorded the
judgment of the Attorney General in his capacity as "champion of the interests of minority
voters" under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). One can also see it in
the Court's willingness to define the scope of statutory violations more broadly than similar
constitutional violations. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976), for example,
the Court enunciated an "intent" test for racial classifications that violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment (or the equal protection aspect of the fifth amend-
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The degree of strain on judicial resources is also related to the
relative competence of the judiciary to resolve the particular social
issue involved in a given controversy. The more uncertain the judiciary is about how to resolve the issue, and the more it needs to
learn about the subject matter, the greater will be its inclination to
adopt a resolution couched in flexible terms to be delimited in subsequent litigation. In the narrowest sense, judicial competence is
determined by the training and background of judges. By virtue of
their experience, for example, judges have a degree of special competence to decide questions of procedural due process or criminal
procedure. Where the legislation under review affects judicial procedure or quasi-judicial, administrative procedure, judges feel more
confident, probably with justification, in their ability to dispose accurately and efficiently of the issue than where the legislation concerns subjects farther from their common experience.
But the concern with judicial competence goes beyond how
judges are trained or what specific information they have. Judges
are actors in a larger judicial process. The information they receive
is, to a significant degree, that produced by the particular litigants
before them; judges have few formal channels for independent investigation. More important, the judicial system is poorly placed to
receive information on the desires and preferences of the public or
any given part of it.
It is one thing to make a list of considerations or interests; it is
quite another to determine the weights to be given conflicting interests in a given context. Even if the issue before the court is one
of procedural due process, and even if one assumes that procedures
serve only instrumental purposes,31 resolution of the issue cannot
ment due process clause) while retaining the broader "impact" test for violations of civil
rights statutes. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971). One sees the
effort to replicate the political process through the use of a representative panel in the approach of the district court in Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), discussed in M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIvIsM 75-122 (1982). The role of the panel as a replica-

tion of the political process is a theme advanced in Bill Clune's book review of M. REBELL
AND A. BLOCK, supra. See Clune, Book Review, 93 YALE L.J 763, 774-75 (1984).
The point of recognizing the constraints imposed on the judiciary by the limits of its
physical resources is simply that the judiciary must consider those constraints in determining how it will respond to a given social issue. The Court, and the judiciary in general, may
be physically incapable of playing an active role in more than a limited number of social
controversies that require significant and continuing outlays of judicial resources. But the
existence of this constraint should begin an analysis of judicial review, not conclude it.
31 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (key to procedural due process
is whether the safeguards adequately decrease the risk of erroneous deprivation). There are
strong arguments that procedures should exist not only to serve the instrumental purpose of
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ignore the basic desires and perceptions of the populace about the
trade-off between accuracy or fairness and other ends on which society might expend resources. The determination of such trade-offs
is the sort of basic choice commonly left to such diviners of the
aggregate popular perception as the legislature or the market. I do
not mean that the judiciary is always inferior at making these
choices-that judgment depends upon a consideration of the relative efficacy of each of the available institutions in the given context. The point is that access to information broadly defined is an
important element in any assessment of judicial competence.
C.

The Political Question Doctrine

Under the rubric "political question doctrine," the Court has
declared that certain constitutional issues are nonjusticiable because they are exclusively the responsibility of the "political"
branches of government. Given what both the Court 2 and com-

greater accuracy but also to acknowledge the dignity and individuality of those who must
deal with governmental bureaucracy. See, e.g., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The
Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885, 885-922 (1981). When such considerations are included, the need for inquiry into the public perception about the trade-off between accuracy and other ends in order to decide even a procedural issue becomes still more
pressing.
32 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court summarized the factors that are
likely to make an issue nonjusticiable under the doctrine:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in
which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or
more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
The first two nonpositivistic factors stand out as concerns about the ability of the judiciary: "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the case]; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion . . . ." Even the elements that follow are institutional. They reflect
Alexander Bickel's notion of protecting the judiciary's "institutional capital," by which
Bickel meant the ability of the judiciary to command respect for its decisions from the other
branches of government and from the populace as a whole. Without a sufficient level of
respect, the judiciary, lacking its own executive power, would be virtually impotent. See A.
BicKEL, supra note 18, at 25-26; see also infra text following note 80 (discussing Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
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mentatorsss have identified as a concern with questions of institutional competence in this area of the Court's jurisprudence, the political question doctrine seems an obvious place to begin an inquiry
into judicial competence as an aspect of comparative institutional
analysis.
Nearly twenty years ago, Professor Fritz Scharpf, focusing on
the political question doctrine, undertook a thoughtful institutional analysis that even today provides useful insights into the
meaning and scope of judicial competence. 4 Early in his article, in
a definition of what he calls "functional analysis," Scharpf neatly
captures the view that constitutional law often engages questions
of institutional abilities and that strains on those abilities can lead
to either judicial innovation or judicial restraint:
The term "functional" as used throughout this article refers to the interrelationship between the nature of the task
which the Court is performing and the means which it can
employ for the performance of this task. If its ordinary means
prove inadequate for a particular task, the Court may react
either by enlarging its arsenal oft means or by limiting the
tasks which it will perform. Both reactions will be characterized as functional.3 5
Scharpf identified three attributes of the judiciary that limit
its competence especially in political question cases: limitations on
access to information; the need for uniformity of decision; and the
need to defer to the wider responsibility of the political branches.36
One may observe these attributes at work in the foreign relations
cases, which Scharpf and others take as paradigmatic of the political question doctrine.
The conduct of foreign affairs requires flexibility, secrecy, expedition and special expertise. The Court's decisionmaking, however, is deliberate and exposed. The judiciary has no separate
means of access to foreign intelligence, and the adversarial process
affords little opportunity for providing it. Any attempt to break
the government's hold on foreign intelligence raises the possibility
3 Laurence Tribe, who is otherwise critical of institutional anaylsis, see infra notes
186-200 and accompanying text, stresses the role of judicial competence in the political
question doctrine in his treatise. Tribe's treatise also summarizes other commentary on the
political question doctrine. See L. TRmE, AMERmCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71-79 (1978).
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
,1Id. at 523 n.21.
3 Id. at 567-83.
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of exposing sensitive information, a risk the Court has little way of
assessing in advance. Even if the judiciary can acquire information
germane to the foreign relations issue to be addressed in the case
before it, it might well be unable to understand the context in
which that issue arises, since the issue might interact with other
issues as to which the Court has neither control nor cognizance beyond a sense of their existence. Given these limitations, the judiciary is forced to be concerned that it may be doing damage by exposing sensitive information, reducing necessary flexibility, or
otherwise producing undesirable results.
Scharpf recognized that the Court could respond to these limitations in several ways other than the abstention required by the
political question doctrine. For example, the Court might use such
procedural or jurisdictional responses as "standing" or "ripeness"
to delay its decision in an effort to clarify the issues and facts.
Yet Scharpf recognized that this response would not be available
in every case since there would be instances in which such techniques simply could not provide the Court with the information
necessary to gain control over the particulars. Even here, Scharpf
suggested, the Court could avoid abstaining by adopting a sweeping or "absolute" substantive solution: "When resolution of the issue as such would require information which is generally difficult
to obtain, the Court may redefine the substantive standards in the
'absolute' or 'abstract' terms of an unqualified grant of power or of
an unqualified limitation upon power, whichever appears more desirable to the Court."3 8 Scharpf argued that such an absolute response would be less likely where the lack of information was so
severe that the Court could have no basis for presuming that its
sweeping response would be even "a tenable and workable accomodation of the interests at stake."3 9 In that instance, abstention seems the preferable alternative.
Yet, as Scharpf recognized, his functional analysis, with its focus on degrees of judicial competence, was somehow incomplete.
Scharpf understood well that the judicial limitations he had identified existed to varying degrees not only where foreign affairs were
concerned, but also in other cases, many of which fell well outside
37 See id. at 519-23. Here Scharpf was explicitly reflecting the influence of Bickel's
concept of "passive virtues." Compare id. (agreeing with Bickel on function of judicial review
but arguing that political question doctrine nonetheless is not fully justified), with A. BICKEL, supra note 18, at 11-98 (discussing the nature and justification of judicial review).

3SScharpf, supra note 34, at 567.
39 Id.
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even the broadest reading of the political question doctrine. War
and national security cases, Scharpf argued, raised functional difficulties of the same order as foreign relations cases, and yet were
only tangentially implicated in the political question doctrine.40 He
explained this difference by noting that war and national security
cases often involve important human rights or separation of powers questions.4 1 In fact, where "important individual rights" were
involved, Scharpf noted that even foreign relations issues sometimes escaped the political question doctrine.4 2
This "individual rights" exception has been chronicled by
others,43 usually with citation to Scharpf. But to identify such an
exception is really just to beg the question of the true scope of the
political question doctrine. Although Scharpf dug behind the standard phrases to isolate functional factors that explained some of
the apparent inconsistencies in the political question doctrine, he
stopped too soon. Most constitutional challenges to action by the
political branches, including those declared nonjusticiable under
the political question doctrine, involve claims of serious, detrimental effects upon individuals. It is of little help to define the limits
of the political question doctrine by reference to individual rights
without having defined the category "individual rights"--something that Scharpf does not attempt.
Scharpf's analysis fails to compare institutions. He did not extend his functional analysis to the political branches whose action
the Court reviews. In looking at the judiciary, Scharpf was sensitive not only to the identification of functional problems, but also
to the various ways (e.g., abstention, "absolute" solutions) in which
the Court might cope with those problems in particular cases. He
did not, however, give parallel treatment to the political branches
whose decisions are in question. He made only vague allusions to
the corresponding advantages of the political branches and gave no
consideration to the various ways in which those advantages might
be given play.
Despite its unbalanced emphasis on only one institution, a
4
problem we shall see in the work of other writers "-and
its consequent failure to define "important individual rights," Scharpf's es-

40

Id. at 583-84.

Id.
42 Id. at 584.
41

43 See L. HENKIN, FoRE GN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrruTioN 494 n.35 (1972); L. TRmE,
supra note 33, at 72 n.1.
4 See, e.g., infra Part H (discussing John Hart Ely's constitutional theory).
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say stands as a fine and, unfortunately, relatively isolated example
of careful and creative institutional analysis. His attempt to define
the limitations on the judiciary and his examination of the consequences of those limitations in different legal settings are the best
in the constitutional law literature. Recognizing the strength of
this beginning, it seems appropriate to focus on the types of cases
Scharpf studied-foreign affairs, war, and national security
cases-in order to broaden and refine the analysis.
D. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,45 the Court faced a case combining issues of foreign policy with serious questions of legislative
and executive malfunction. The evolution of the case, particularly
of the government's position, as well as its resolution reveals the
interaction of these institutional forces.
In Hampton, several resident aliens claimed that a long-standing civil service regulation excluding aliens from most federal civil
service jobs violated their rights under the fifth amendment. In the
lower courts, the government argued first, that the provision
served the public interest because certain jobs required the attributes of citizenship and second, that the sweeping exclusion of all
aliens from most federal civil services jobs was justified as a matter
of administrative efficiency. 48 Such arguments normally prevail
under the weak "rational basis" scrutiny accorded most legislation
challenged as violative of equal protection. Typically the government need offer only a plausible general purpose and some connection between that purpose and the statute; even the weakest arguments about administrative convenience usually suffice to satisfy
the latter inquiry.
The District Court largely accepted the government's arguments, 48 but the Ninth Circuit held that rational basis scrutiny was
not applicable to the case. 49 Between the district court and Ninth
Circuit decisions in Hampton, the Supreme Court had reiterated,
in Sugarman v. Dougall, its position 50 that alienage is a suspect
classification. 51 While noting that the rationale of Sugarman, a
45 426 U.S. 88 (1976).

See Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527, 531-32 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949).
See Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527, 531-32 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 1974).
50 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
51 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973). The Court in Graham v. Richardson,
46
4'
4'
4'
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case involving state action, was not squarely applicable in the federal context, 52 the Ninth Circuit nevertheless found the reasoning
of the case instructive, 53 and accordingly applied strict scrutiny to
54
invalidate the regulation in Hampton.
Following the complete rejection of its administrative efficiency argument below, the government underplayed that argument before the Supreme Court, emphasizing instead the foreign
policy implications of the treatment of aliens. In particular, the
government argued that the President needed the power to vary
the federal employment eligibility of aliens, perhaps even by reference to their countries of origin, in order to give full scope to his
treaty-making powers. 5 In making this argument to the Court, the
government raised the stakes. In the decisions below, reasons to
suspect the political process had been identified, the presumption
of constitutionality had been weakened, and strict scrutiny had
been invoked. Now the government played its best card by identifying a reason to suspect the judicial alternative: the spectre of foreign affairs.
The Hampton Court affirmed the decision below to invalidate
the regulation. But it did so on grounds different from those employed by the courts below and, indeed, seemingly different from
those the Court had employed for over forty years.5 It refused to
decide that an exclusion of aliens from civil service employment
was invalid per se. The law was declared invalid because the wrong
entity was allowed to make the decision. Had the decision to exclude been made by legislation or perhaps even by direct Executive
Order, it might well have passed constitutional muster. 5 But the
implementation of foreign policy and basic immigration policy, the
Court ruled, could not be left to the discretion of the head of the
Civil Service, at least not without a clear indication of such delega-

403 U.S. 365, 372-75, emphasized the political powerlessness of this disenfranchised group.
For a discussion of political powerlessness, see supra text following note 11.
5, Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1974).
53 Id.
Id. at 1037.
5 They [the government petitioners] argue, for example, that the broad exclusion may
facilitate the President's negotiation of treaties with foreign powers by enabling him to
offer employment opportunities to citizens of a given foreign country in exchange for
reciprocal concessions-an offer he could not make if those aliens were already eligible

for federal jobs.
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 104.
11 See id. at 117-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 116.
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tion by Congress or the executive.58
The Court recognized that "the paramount federal power over
immigration and naturalization forecloses a simple extension" to
the federal context of the equal protection logic barring state attempts to exclude aliens from the state civil service.5 9 Yet, the fact
that the exclusion burdened a class which had such a weak political position signaled the need for more than minimal judicial scrutiny. The Court chose to apply this scrutiny, however, not to the
provision excluding aliens from civil service jobs, but to the decision to delegate that authority to the civil service. Under normal
circumstances, the legislative history, which showed, at worst, a
long-term acceptance of the regulation by Congress and the President,60 would clearly have been sufficient to find the requisite legislative intent to delegate the decision. But the Court, concluding
that these were not normal circumstances, required clearer indications of deliberativeness not only in the evolution of the regulation,
61
but also in the prior delegation of responsibility.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, suggested that this was a novel
theory, "inexplicably meld[ing] together the concepts of equal protection and procedural and substantive due process." 6 While the
articulated theory, with its inexplicable mix of traditional legal
concepts, may have been novel in a doctrinal sense, from an institutional standpoint, it seems both explicable and sensible. As the
Court clearly recognized, both the political and judicial processes
were strained in this context. The Court was sensitive to the political fragility of the group discriminated against yet was unable either to dismiss out of hand or to take upon itself the foreign policy
questions involved. It chose a response that represented a compromise between these considerations by examining carefully the process of decision, a matter more within its competence, even though
the particulars of the decision itself were outside its institutional
capacity.
I do not suggest that this compromise is the best possible institutional resolution. Since the political weakness of aliens remains a problem whether the decision is left to Congress or the
President, the Court may only have delayed the final resolution of

's

Id. at 116.

"Id. at 100.
60
61

62

See id. at 105-14.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 119.
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the issue.6 s But however the issue is resolved, it clearly involves
difficult and important institutional questions, questions that all
the Justices were forced to face whatever their final choices. For
the practitioner, the case shows the importance of institutional factors and provides lessons in prediction and strategy. For the evaluator, it highlights important dimensions that must be considered in
analyses of the law.
E. Korematsu v. United States
The institutional configuration in Hampton is not novel. Quite
similar elements can be seen in the controversial case of Korematsu v. United States,6 4 where the Court addressed the constitutionality of the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from designated areas of the west coast. Korematsu was a native-born
American of Japanese ancestry convicted of refusing to obey a military order to leave his home.6 5 The military order had been issued
by the regional military commander pursuant to powers granted by
Congress and the President.
In upholding the constitutionality of the government action
and the associated conviction of the defendant, the majority, in an
opinion authored by Justice Black, enunciated the modern equal
protection test with its two levels of scrutiny. The Court declared
that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect" and would be subject to "the
most rigid scrutiny."6 6 To satisfy this test, the government must
show "pressing public necessity. 6 7 In Korematsu itself, the Court
found the existence of such pressing public necessity based on the
record presented by the government. The order was issued within

43 In this sense, the compromise of the Hampton Court is a form of "remand" to the
legislature suggested by Bickel & Wellington, supra note 18, at 14-35.
In fact, the Court, confronted with subsequent executive action, Exec. Order No. 11,935,
5 C.F.R. §7.4 (1984), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. §3301 app. at 521 (1982), promulgating the exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service, seems to have avoided the issue to the disadvantage of aliens. See Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441 U.S.
905 (1979); Jalil v. Campbell, 590 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1978). I leave evaluation of this
choice as well as the Court's retreat on the treatment of aliens at the state level, see Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), for future work.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
66Because Korematsu was convicted only of disobeying the exclusion order, the Court
did not address the constitutionality of the further order that he report to an "assembly
center to be relocated"--most likely to a relocation center, id. at 222, or, in the phrase of the
petitioner explicitly disavowed by the Court, id. at 223, a concentration camp.
66 Id. at 216.
C7

Id.
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the first year of American involvement in World War II. The government argued that there were disloyal west coast residents who
were of Japanese descent, even among those who were American
citizens, and that "it was impossible to bring about an immediate
segregation of the disloyal from the loyal [citizens]." 68 Therefore, it
was necessary, the government argued, to confine the movement of
persons of Japanese descent, to place a curfew on them, and to
order their temporary relocation. In Hirabayashi v. United
States,69 the Court upheld the validity of the curfew, and in Korematsu it upheld the validity of excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast war area.
Speaking of Korematsu, a prominent modern commentator
has noted that, "[i]n retrospect, the Supreme Court's tolerance of
the war-time excesses of Congress seems wrong, but in retrospect it
is also clear that the Court saw no reasonable alternative to deference." 0 It appears that a majority of the Court did operate as
though it believed that it had little alternative. The Court's response was highly deferential to the judgment of "properly constituted military authorities, 7 1 with the consequence that "rigid
scrutiny" was, in fact, very weak. The majority simply accepted the
government's assertions that there were disloyal residents of Japanese descent and that these disloyal residents could not be separated expeditiously from the loyal citizens.
Justice Jackson, in dissent, stated the Court's predicament
clearly:
I cannot say, from any evidence before me, that the orders of General DeWitt [the military commander who issued
the order] were not reasonably expedient military precautions,
nor could I say that they were . ...
The limitation under which courts always will labor in examining the necessity for a military order are illustrated by
this case. How does the Court know that these orders have a
reasonable basis in necessity? No evidence whatever on that
subject has been taken by this or any other court. There is
sharp controversy as to the credibility of the DeWitt report.
So the Court, having no real evidence before it, has no choice
but to accept General DeWitt's own unsworn, self-serving

6 Id. at 219.
e 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943).
70 L. TRInBE, supra note 33, at 277.
71 323 U.S. at 223.
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statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what he
did was reasonable. 2
Yet, faced with an inability to assess independently the conclusions of the military commander, the Court did not have to accept the government's assertions blindly. It could have rejected the
commander's report and the government's assertions and made its
own determinations about the relevant issues. At least one Justice
was willing to do this. While conceding that a very real threat of
invasion existed at the time the order was issued, Justice Murphy
argued that a sweeping exclusion based on race was not necessary.7" He pointed to the experience in England where tribunals
had separately assessed the loyalty of over 70,000 German and
Austrian aliens and interned only 2,000.74 In this connection, Justice Murphy did more than express his opinion as to good policy;
he expressed substantial doubt about the integrity and validity of
the process that had led to the government's decision. In a few
pages, he laid bare the real possibility that the worst sort of racial
stereotypes were at work, presenting General DeWitt's attitude toward individuals of Japanese ancestry as essentially racist.75 He
presented evidence that pressure for the mass evacuation had been
applied by special interest groups concerned with eliminating commercial competition from Japanese-Americans who had had the temerity to undersell white producers.7" In short, Justice Murphy
presented strong grounds to distrust the political process underlying the relocation decision.
Yet, even with this strong indictment of the governmental process, only Justice Murphy and, on somewhat narrower grounds,
Justice Roberts were willing to find the government's action unconstitutional. Congress and the President had been aware of the
English experience and rejected such an approach. The decision,
moreover, had been made by an experienced military commander
in the field. Why should the judgment of a Justice of the Supreme
Court be preferred? The majority included Justices Black and
Douglas, who were to be strongly associated with the protection of
minority rights, and Chief Justice Stone, who had authored the
Carolene Products footnote. They were aware of the possible foibles of General DeWitt and the political process. Indeed, the "most

7"

Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 241-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 242 n.16 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

71

Id. at 236.

7"
73

76Id. at 239 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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rigid scrutiny" they proposed for "suspect classifications '' 77 suggested that they were uncomfortable with the government's decision. But Korematsu presented the Court with a difficult choice
between highly imperfect institutions. Congress, the executive and
the military had access to information and the capability to understand its meaning in the context of the war, but they also had
shown clear signs of bias in assessing the information and in weighing all the interests involved. 78 The Court had inferior access to
information and inferior understanding of the general context, but
it was less subject to popular racial bias and special interests.
Faced with this dilemma, Justice Jackson argued that the
Court should refuse to decide the constitutionality of the government's actions and refuse the military access to civil courts to enforce its orders. 9 He would, in effect, have declared the issue nonjusticiable on bases closely aligned to the political question
doctrine.
All of the opinions in Korematsu, then, focus upon the problem of choosing between two institutions both of whose capacities
were in doubt. Indeed, institutional comparison seems explicit in
the Justices' analyses of the case. To observe as much, however, is
not to argue that the institutional analysis in Korematsu was necessarily unmixed with concerns other than the relative competences of the judiciary and the political branches.8 0
The Korematsu majority was unwilling to substitute the
Court's judgment of national security needs for that of the execu77 Id. at 216.
78 It now appears that, in fact, high-ranking government officials from both the War

Department and the Justice Department suppressed information concerning the internment
of Japanese-American citizens. Information indicating that mass internment was unnecessary and individual loyalty hearings were a feasible alternative apparently was kept from
the Supreme Court during the Hirabayashiand Korematsu hearings. See P. IRONS, JUSTICE
AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 199, 201-02, 205, 207,
285, 292, 317 (1983).
71 Id. at 243-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting). One should not overestimate the practical significance of such a refusal. Given the resources of the military in this war zone, the courts
were not really necessary to it. Korematsu had been taken from his home and placed in a
relocation camp without court order.
8o Neither is it to claim that the institutional analysis in Korematsu conforms to what
we have come to expect from later courts. Although the Carolene Products footnote and the
Roosevelt Court's decisions revealed some awareness of the plight of racial minorities and
some distrust of the treatment accorded such minorities by the political process, see Bixby,
The Roosevelt Court, DemocraticIdeology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United
States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 743-45 (1981), it is likely that this awareness has grown
with time. Thus, the degree to which racial classifications were suspect in the minds of the
Justices may well have been different in 1944 than in subsequent applications of the strict
scrutiny test first articulated in Korematsu.
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tive and the military. It bears noting, however, that this unwillingness may not have stemmed entirely from the Court's assessment
of its relative incompetence. In wartime, public support for the political branches is unusually strong and that support is all too frequently fueled by xenophobia. A Court already uncertain of the
underlying facts and of its ability to substitute its decision for that
of the political branches may have been all the more concerned
when the case raised the possibility of a confrontation with a wartime Congress and executive. Apart from threats of impeachment
or the possibility of maneuvers like court-packing, wartime poses
the greater threat that the political branches will simply ignore the
Court's decisions, thereby revealing the Court's impotence when
stripped of support from the political branches. 1
The discrepancy between the Justices' perception of the need
to protect racial minorities and the actual need, and the Justices'
fears of confrontation with the political branches, are additional
institutional factors that deserve attention in the analysis of cases
like Korematsu. Whether and to what extent the outcome in Korematsu was a product of ignorance about the depth and importance
of racism or the product of fear of confrontation is not an easy
question. Some of the Justices seemed willing to confront the political process in Korematsu itself, and there can be little doubt
about Justice Murphy's sensitivity to racism and political bias. In
the same Term, the entire Court risked confrontation with a wartime government when it unanimously invalidated the authority of
the War Location Commission to intern those excluded from the
west coast without an actual showing of individual guilt.8" But no
matter how one explains the result in the particular case, these
concerns about institutional capacity are important questions,
pointing up the need for a careful and systematic institutional
comparison.
F. The Pentagon Papers Case
New York Times v. United States3 is a more recent example
of a case in which an area of traditional suspicion of the political
branches (prior restraints on the publication of political information) combines with an area of difficulty for the judiciary (national
security and foreign intelligence). The executive branch sought an
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See the discussion of institutional capital supra note 32.
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Justice Roberts concurred in the result.
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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injunction against publication of reports prepared for the government on the conduct of the United States's war effort in Southeast
Asia. The information was arguably both sensitive for reasons of
national security and politically embarrassing.
Prior restraint on publication is generally perceived as perhaps
the most egregious example of an impermissible governmental
abridgement of the freedom of speech and of the press."" Political
incumbents have both the motive and the ability to keep information embarrassing to them away from the general public. Given
this traditional source of distrust, the government confronted a
difficult task in its effort to enjoin publication. As the short per
curiam opinion noted, "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this court5 bearing a heavy presumption against its
8'
constitutional validity.
In fact, the government was unable to overcome this presumption, but it came close. There were three dissenters and, of the six
Justices who rejected the government's plea, three took positions
suggesting that the result would have been different had the injunction been sought on the basis of a violation of an act of Congress or even of the violation of a prior Executive Order.8 6 It appears, thus, that the government might well have been able to
impose a prior restraint on publication if the proper political institution had made the decision-a formulation quite analogous to
the "structural due process"8 7 approach taken in Hampton. As in
Hampton, too, there was a recognition of the problems confronting
the judiciary: "[I]t is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national
defense require both confidentiality and secrecy."8 Once again, the
Court was faced with a case implicating foreign affairs and foreign
intelligence. Specifically, the Court had the task of assessing the

" There is some evidence that the framers of the first amendment may have meant to
cover no more than prohibitions on prior restraints. See Z. CHAFE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 9-12 (1941); L. LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AMERIcAN HISTORY 200-01 (1960); Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time,

32 HARv. L. REv. 932, 938-39 (1919); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 648, 650-52 (1955).
85 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
86 Justices Marshall and White stressed the absence of congressional action outlawing
such publication. 403 U.S. at 747 (Marshall, J., concurring), 732 (White, J., concurring).
Justices Stewart and White stressed the absence of either a congressional act or clearly
promulgated executive regulations. Id. at 728-30 (Stewart, J., concurring, White, J., joining).
8 Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1976) (coining
phrase "structural due process").
" New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. at 738 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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impact of the release of sensitive information on these subjects.
The opinions of the other three Justices who found the restraints invalid also show the difficulty in assessing the implications of releasing this information. Justices Black, Douglas, and
Brennan took an absolutist position: under virtually no circumstances should an injunction be issued to restrain publication., 9
Such a position is consistent with Scharpf's observation that the
Court's lack of access to information often produces sweeping or
"absolute" solutions.9 0 These Justices recognized that a more discriminating approach to prior restraint is generally unrealistic. The
Court may speak of scrutinizing the materials and claims of the
government, but its actual ability to assess such materials and
claims independently is usually extraordinarily limited.
The majority and dissenters alike struggled with the same institutional quandary. Cases construing the first amendment treat
prior restraints on speech as a most suspect-if not an absolutely
precluded-governmental restriction of speech and press.9 1 Nonetheless, as the dissenters argued, thereby articulating an approach
that expressly paralleled the political question doctrine, the restriction allegedly served an important governmental purpose that
is not easily amenable to independent assessment by the judiciary.2 In the final analysis, all of the opinions in the case reflect the
importance of institutional choice, and it is again difficult to see
how the case can be understood without understanding the institutional perceptions of the Justices or evaluated without a careful
consideration of the relative institutional capacities of the courts
and the political branches.
G.

Hard Cases and Beyond

From the political question doctrine and Scharpfs analysis of
it, I have moved to a consideration of cases in which questions of
foreign affairs, war, and national security-issues which severely
strain judicial competence-arise in conjunction with parallel
strains on the credibility of the political process. The outcomes of
the cases, the levels of scrutiny employed, and the range of ap89 Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring), 720 (Douglas, J., concurring), 725 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
90 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
9' See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
92 403 U.S. at 757-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun expressly joined this
dissent. Id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, while expressing general
agreement with Justice Harlan's opinion, argued that the case was not properly before the
Court for decision. Id. at 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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proaches taken by the various Justices reflect the interaction of
these conflicting institutional forces.
These are hard cases in institutional terms. The decisions are
controversial, their reasoning strained, and their doctrinal theories
sometimes novel. It is commonly claimed that hard cases make bad
law. But when hard cases force the Court to confront obvious
strains and difficulties, they show us the underlying structure of
decision in its starkest terms. Judges deciding such cases are
forced to search a little deeper to decide and to explain their decisions, and the controversies among judges engendered in the
course of such decisions reveal otherwise hidden assumptions and
reasoning.
In these cases, the content of individual rights appears to be
dependent, at least in part, on institutional factors. When the
Korematsu majority stated that racial classifications were suspect
and that government action employing them would be rigorously
scrutinized, it provided a practical civil right based on a classic
source of distrust of the political process, racial prejudice. Lawyers
whose clients are harmed by such classifications have something to
work with; they have a reasonable chance of successfully defeating
such governmental action. But the case also showed that where
these grounds for suspicion of the political process are combined
with subject matter which strains the competence of the judiciary,
the potential for success and for vindication of the associated civil
right are both put in doubt. Korematsu provided a practical right
against government mistreatment based on race, but it was conditioned on the ability of the Court to handle the issue in the particular context in which it was presented. New York Times defined
and upheld a traditional right to be free of prior restraint, but it
also signaled potential limits on that right reflecting the Court's
inability to handle certain related substantive issues and its deference to the superior abilities of other branches. The "novel conception"98 in Hampton explicitly recognized conflicting institutional
concerns, and defined a right that attempted to accommodate
them.
Beyond the realm of foreign affairs, war, and national security,
there are good grounds to believe that institutional forces are still
at work. The problems of access to information and ability to understand and control larger contexts are pervasive. Important issues tend to be complex issues. The funding and administration of
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Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 117 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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major public undertakings-education, health, and criminal justice-present problems analogous to those faced by the judiciary in
the cases we have discussed. These are vast enterprises, usually operated by administrative agencies controlled by the legislative and
executive branches. Courts have limited albeit varying, expertise
in these areas. Furthermore, the typical case will usually present a
court with a poor opportunity to exercise the expertise it has, since
any controversy is likely to involve only a small part of the larger
enterprise. Yet, as with the hard cases I have discussed, the legislative decisions underlying such controversies can impose burdens on
discrete and insular minorities, restrict political speech and association, or otherwise give rise to serious suspicions of the political
decisionmaking process.
The institutional tensions apparent in the hard cases, then,
are present as well in many other constitutional cases, though the
range of cases and the different institutional conditions and outcomes are too varied to be treated in detail here. It is enough to
observe for present purposes that the Court's constitutional jurisprudence tolerates varying degrees of judicial intervention. With
respect to the equal protection cases, Justice Marshall has argued
that while the Court has tended to speak as though there are only
two extreme levels of scrutiny-strict and minimal-it often operates as though there is in fact a spectrum of varying levels of scrutiny.9 4 Where along this spectrum a case falls depends, in Marshall's view, upon the suspiciousness of the classification in
question and the fundamentality of the right or interest infringed.9 5 The Court's responses in the reverse racial discrimina", See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-100 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
95 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The concept of fundamental rights and interests employed in both equal protection and substantive due process cases is cloaked in mystery. As the Court has itself pointed
out, fundamentality in a constitutional sense is not determined by the societal significance
of the interest involved. See id. at 30. Instead, the question is whether the right is explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. But the process of implication appears selective enough to suggest that the basic question is being begged. It is noteworthy that many of
the fundamental rights have been derived by implicatibn from the first amendment and
involve political activity, the integrity of which is a powerful institutional concern. Solicitude for such rights may well reflect the basic distrust of legislation enacted by incumbents
that directly promotes incumbency. Other fundamental rights identified by the
Court-principally privacy rights-remain largely unexplained and difficult to distinguish
from other important societal interests given far less attention by the Court. Since issues of
unconventional sexual choice may involve a configuration of interests in which members of a
restricted minority each suffer a substantial harm while members of the majority benefitted
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tion and gender discrimination cases seem to support Marshall's
argument.9 6 Moreover, in the cases in which Marshall, writing in
dissent, articulated his sliding scale or spectrum analysis, the
Court majority may well have been using, albeit not articulating, a
sliding scale of its own. In both cases, the majority declined to intervene because the classification in question was not clearly suspect and because the judiciary was not competent to deal with the
substantive issues involved. 7 Recalling that suspiciousness is a
measure of the likelihood of legislative malfunction,9 8 it seems at
least plausible to hypothesize that in these cases the Court was
basing its decision as to whether it would intervene in part on an
assessment both of its ability to deal with the social issues involved
and on the level of distrust engendered by the underlying action of
the political branches. The Court's assessment of the presence of
these concerns in each case, this analysis suggests, will determine,
at least in part, its willingness to intervene and the degree of its
intervention.
In this overview of the comparative institutional approach to
constitutional law, I have offered working definitions of the basic
institutions, as well as some conceptions of institutional defect or
malfunction, all to show that even these simple notions can organize and facilitate the analysis of important constitutional cases. It
may be disturbing to some readers that my analyses of the cases in
this part of this article have focused on what judges have said. After all, judges may talk in terms of institutional analysis and decide on other grounds.9 But the central place given institutional

by the restriction each enjoy only a small gain, the political process, given a simple majority
voting model, may be suspect as a decider of social good for such issues. For further discussion of this form of legislative malfunction, see Komesar, supra note 13, at 223-29.
The concept of fundamental rights and interests deserves lengthier treatment than it
can receive here. As I suggest below, I believe that such a treatment will show that a definition of fundamental rights or interests itself is a proxy for a comparative institutional determination. See infra text following note 200.
" See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
" San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), was a case involving
the constitutionality of using local property taxes to finance schools. Although the Rodriguez majority stated that practical considerations had no role to play in the adjudication of
the constitutional issues presented, it plainly was concerned with the competence of the
judiciary to decide the issues of educational policy and taxation involved. See id. at 56-59.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), involved the extent of a state's duty to fund
welfare. Again, the majority made clear that it considered this issue to be a difficult one for
the judiciary. See id. at 487.
98 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
99 See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-65 (1980) (noting judges' attraction to writing as though they were
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comparison here did not stem from its articulation in judicial opinions. The causal relationship is the opposite. Institutional comparison is an essential element of constitutional law. It is not surprising, therefore, to see it in judicial opinions. Such articulations,
however, are not essential to my argument. On a normative level, it
makes no difference whether judges believe they are making institutional choices. The fact remains that they are making institutional choices, and an analysis of institutional choice is essential in
evaluating their decisions. But, even on a descriptive level, proof
that judges did not think in institutional terms would not alone
belie my characterization of their actions. 10 0
As I have noted, the judicial decisions examined here are particularly significant because they involved difficult and important
institutional choices, and the deciding judges appeared to have appreciated this fact. Perhaps those judges employed institutional
consideratiohs cynically-an unestablished proposition in my view.
But even if they did, the irony would be that what was employed
as make-weight turned out to be, in essence, what should have
been considered.
The remainder of the article examines some of the recent attempts at institutional analysis in the constitutional law literature
as well as some recent expressions of skepticism about the relevance of institutional analysis. Although the constitutional scholars
considered here offer some valuable institutional insights, they do
not offer a comparative analysis of institutional attributes and,
therefore, make basic analytical errors. In the end, they force narrow institutional analyses to yield broad conclusions about constitutional law. Both the contributions and the limitations of these
analyses, however, are useful in my search for a fuller understanding of comparative institutional analysis.
I will be harder on the scholars than I have been on the
judges. Because they are not faced with the responsibility and demands of making decisions, scholars have the luxury to speculate
about their concerns and to recognize explicitly the tentative and
experimental nature of their theories. As a consequence, they remain the best source of general theory, and critical examination of
their efforts is justifiably the core of theory building. When, in future work, the general theory is turned on specific cases, there will

helping to perfect the political process only and were not making choices among substantive
values).
300 1 have explored this theme in Komesar, supra note 1, at 1354-56, 1363-65.
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be time enough to examine the work of the Court with a more critical eye.
II. THE ROLE OF POLITICAL MALFUNCTION: THE APPROACH OF
JOHN HART ELY

In Democracy and Distrust,10 1 Dean John Hart Ely offers an
institutionally-based conception of constitutional judicial review
that focuses particularly on the attributes of the political process.
To Ely, the political branches should determine social policy, and
the judiciary-the least democratic branch-should be restricted
to correcting malfunctions in the more democratic political
branches. The judiciary's task is to assure that democratic institutions properly arrive at substantive decisions. 0 2 The judiciary, in
other words, perfects the political process; process-not substance-is the correct, the legitimate, and the intended business of
the judiciary.0 3
Ely's theory has descriptive as well as normative aspects. He
sees in the text of the Constitution and in its interpretation by the
Supreme Court a basic concern with departures from the democratic political process. 10 4 To Ely, this concern is epitomized in the
famous Carolene Products footnote, which signalled the end of the
interventionist era of "economic due process," but which also set
out those circumstances in which judicial intervention might still
be expected. 10 5 To Ely, these circumstances are ones which raise
concerns about malfunction in the political process and about its
correction.
Ely's approach constitutes a serious and significant attempt at
an institutional analysis of constitutional law. He sees the Constitution as concerned primarily with the mode of decisionmaking
rather than with dictating specific decisions. He carries forward
this view of the central place of decisionmaking into an analysis of
the role of the judiciary which begins, wisely in my view, by recognizing the Constitution's primary reliance on the political process.
For Ely, the judiciary's role only begins when there are serious
problems with the political process.1 08 His concern about the attributes of the political process is more than an afterthought. It is
101 J. ELY, supra note 15.
10 Id. at 73-75, 77-88.
103 Id.

at 181.
See id. at 73-77.
'o5 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The text of the
footnote appears infra note 143.
10 See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 15, at 103.
104
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the central feature of his analysis.
But Ely's analysis, however important, is basically incomplete.
He does not acknowledge that malfunction is a product of the imperfection endemic to all human institutions, including the judiciary. Whereas Ely explores the imperfections of the judiciary with
great gusto in, for example, his criticism of the fundamental rights
theorists,"' he virtually ignores these imperfections in developing
his own theory. He is unable, therefore, to weigh effectively the
defects in the judiciary against the defects in the political
branches. He sees that the ability of the political process to function varies across the range of social issues-for example, those
that involve race or speech versus those that do not. But he does
not observe that the competence of the alternative institution-the
judiciary-may be similarly variable. Accordingly, he does not
compare the respective institutional imperfections across the range
of constitutional issues. As I have demonstrated, social issues that
raise the spectre of legislative or executive malfunction, such as.
those involving race or speech, can also involve foreign affairs, war,
and the administration of complex social programs-issues that
raise questions of judicial incompetence. The presence of strains
on the political process in such instances is relevant, but it is not
determinative. In the end, although Ely provides a central place in
his theory for institutional considerations, his analysis of those
considerations fails to place them fully in context.
In place of a careful comparison of institutional attributes, Ely
substitutes a distinction between process and substance: the judiciary's role is to police the political process and to correct political
malfunction, while it is the role of the political process to make
value determinations and value judgments. 10 8 This simple distinction is not an adequate substitute for institutional comparison. As
I shall demonstrate, the task of policing the political process in
fact requires the judiciary to make difficult and important value
judgments and to substitute these judgments for those made by
the legislative process. In making these judgments, the judiciary is
necessarily involved in precisely the tasks for which Ely supposes
them ill-suited. 10 9 Yet, at the same time, Ely suggests, the political
process is also ill-suited to make these judgments. To avoid this
impasse, an institutional analysis needs something more than Ely's
process/substance distinction can provide.
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See id. at 44-45, 56-60.

10$ See id. at 181.
109 See id. at 43-69.
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Beyond its failure to compare meaningfully the legislative and
judicial processes, Ely's analysis is also built upon an overly narrow
understanding of legislative malfunction. The problems he identifies are certainly important, but they are far from the only important sources of malfunction to be found in our governmental tradition. Ely's limited perception of legislative malfunction is probably
related to his failure to consider the corresponding malfunctions of
the judiciary. Since he relies so heavily on the attributes of the
legislature to justify both the existence of and the limits on the
judicial role, he appears forced to place artificial limits on his list
of legislative defects.
I shall explore these features of Ely's analysis in two ways.
First, I shall examine Ely's basic institutional arguments. I shall
then turn to an examination of the Carolene Products footnote,
the central judicial manifestation of Ely's theory.
A.

Ely's Institutional Theory

The essence of Ely's theory and his institutional argument is
captured in two paragraphs worth full quotation here:
The approach to constitutional adjudication recommended here is akin to what might be called an "antitrust" as
opposed to a "regulatory" orientation to economic affairs-rather than dictate substantive results it intervenes
only when the "market," in our case the political market, is
systemically malfunctioning. (A referee analogy is also not far
off: the referee is to intervene only when one team is gaining
unfair advantage, not because the "wrong" team has scored.)
Our government cannot fairly be said to be "malfunctioning"
simply because it sometimes generates outcomes with which
we disagree, however strongly (and claims that it is reaching
results with which "the people" really disagree-or would "if
they understood"-are likely to be little more than self-deluding projections). In a representative democracy value determinations are to be made by our elected representatives, and if
in fact most of us disapprove we can vote them out of office.
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust,
when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political
change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay
out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote,
representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility
or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest,
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and thereby denying that minority the protection afforded
other groups by a representative system.
Obviously our elected representatives are the last persons
we should trust with identification of either of these situations. Appointed judges, however, are comparative outsiders
in our governmental system, and need worry about continuance in office only very obliquely. This does not give them
some special pipeline to the genuine values of the American
people: In fact, it goes far to ensure that they won't have one.
It does, however, put them in position objectively to assess
claims-though no one could suppose the valuation won't be
full of judgment calls-that either by clogging the channels of
change or by acting as accessories to majority tyranny, our
elected representatives in fact are not representing the interests of those whom the system presupposes they are. 110
A great deal is packed into this short passage. First, Ely posits
an antitrust analogue for constitutional law, focusing upon malfunctions in the political process. Second, he offers a two-part definition of malfunction. Third, he asserts that the judiciary is the
institution best adapted to addressing malfunctions in the political
process-a role it appears to win by default. Each step has fundamental problems.
1. The Antitrust Analogy. According to Ely, antitrust law warrants judicial intervention only when there is a "systematic malfunction" in the market. Applying this principle to constitutional
law, Ely would have the judiciary intervene only when there is a
systemic malfunction in the political process-the "political market." Ely contrasts this antitrust approach, which confines intervention to correcting malfunctions in the market itself, with a
"regulatory" approach, which allows the intervenor to "dictate
substantive results." Presumably, to complete the analogy, the fundamental rights theories that Ely so strongly criticizes'," would be
the constitutional counterpart to this regulatory approach in that
they would have the courts dictate substantive results.
The analogy seems apt, but because there is an analytic flaw in
Ely's description of the antitrust and regulatory modes of intervention into economic affairs, the analogy does not yield the point Ely
seeks to establish. In fact, the analogy undercuts the strength of
Ely's process/substance distinction as a means of allocating institu110 Id. at 102-03.
"'

See id. at 43-72.
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tional responsibility. The difference between the two approaches to
economic affairs is not that one is triggered by "systemic malfunction" while the other is not. Both are most accurately viewed as
reactions to malfunctions of the market. They differ in the form of
intervention, not the reason for intervention.
The antitrust approach is a corrective form of intervention.
Antitrust actions are aimed at correcting the market malfunction
by removing an impediment to the proper functioning of the market. Where collusion by producers or sellers sets a price higher
than the competitive price and a quantity lower than the competitive quantity, the antitrust response is to remove the collusion, so
as to allow market forces to set price and quantity. The regulatory
approach, in contrast, is a substitutive form of intervention.
Rather than attempting to remove the impediment to the market
as a decisionmaker, an agency of government regulates or sets
prices, or quantities, itself. The choice between these modes of intervention depends on a comparison of institutional attributes in a
given setting. Collusion, for example, may be more conducive to
correction (antitrust), while natural monopoly may call for substitution (regulation). The range of potential market malfunctions is
large-problems of information and organization, third party effects, as well as monopolies-and there is a corresponding array of
techniques for intervening in response to these malfunctions. The
correct choice will depend on the particulars of the malfunction to
be addressed as well as on the attributes of the means available to
address it.
Ely's analogy, then, entails institutional complexities that he
does not consider. In the world of economic affairs there is always
some "malfunction" in Ely's sense, always some deviation from
ideal conditions. Systemic malfunction itself is therefore never a
sufficient condition to determine either whether or how to intervene. Rather, the questions of whether and how to intervene depend on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the alternative
modes of intervention. Like the market itself, the institutions that
enforce the antitrust laws and impose regulation are imperfect-they require resources for their administration and they can
make costly mistakes. When, and in what form, intervention is
useful in economic affairs is a basic, difficult, and controversial
comparative institutional question. There is no preferred solution
for all settings.
What is true for the economic analogy is also true for constitutional law. Whether the judiciary is to play any role, and what that
role should be, should not be determined simply on the basis of the
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existence or nonexistence of malfunction in the political process.
Ely may be right to criticize fundamental rights theorists for calling too cavalierly for the substitution of the judicial value judgments for those of the political branches. As I shall argue subsequently, those analysts do overlook key comparative institutional
questions. But it does not follow that substitution need always be
associated with insensitivity to institutional factors, or that substitution is always institutionally inferior to correction or any other
mode of intervention (including nonintervention).
2. The Role of the Judiciary.These observations raise the basic question: Why should "correction," or process, be the business
of the judiciary and "substitution," or substance, be the business
of the legislature? Ely addresses the first part of this question directly only in the passage we have been examining and then only
in one sentence: "Obviously our elected representatives are the last
persons we should trust with identification of [legislative malfunctions]. ' n 2 To Ely, this assertion points to judges as guardians of
the political process because they are "comparative outsiders to
the governmental system." 11 3 These few phrases, by which Ely attempts to explain why correction or process is the business of the
judiciary and, therefore, the basis of constitutional judicial review,
form far too weak a foundation to support the analytical structure
he builds. Ely's assertion that the political process and its central
actors should not be entrusted with the task of identifying and correcting legislative malfunctions manifests a simple principle-that
one cannot reliably judge or correct oneself. This principle, correctly qualified and employed, certainly has relevance to the allocation of institutional responsibility, but it is not alone a sufficient
basis for disqualification. It identifies only a potential imperfection
in one of the alternative institutions. It is probably correct to say
that an institution attempting self-correction should necessarily be
open to some degree of distrust, but, given the inevitable existence
of imperfections in any alternative institutions, recognition of a
single problem in the political branches is an insufficient basis for
allocating decisionmaking responsibility to other institutions.
Consider, for example, Ely's first form of political malfunction.
Is it obvious that attempts to "choke off the channels of political
change" in order to retain power for the "ins" would not or could
not be deterred or controlled in the absence of judicial intervention? Were there no longer judicial review, there would not necesn, Id. at 103.
113
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sarily be a rapid transformation of the government into a dictatorship or oligarchy. Voters, perhaps spurred on by those who
themselves wished office, could be expected to penalize those officials who attempted to curtail seriously valued rights of free
speech and free press. Sweeping attempts to alter the makeup of
the electorate or reallocate votes geographically might also be penalized in a political process in which power is shared among
branches and levels of government. Our political process has a
great many "ins" with a great diversity of desires. This diversity of
individuals and desires, in combination, makes it difficult for a stable majority capable of choking off change to coalesce on a broad
range of issues. Thus, despite a long period of judicial inactivity on
process, voting, and speech, it was nevertheless the case that politically corrupt legislatures produced reforms, the franchise114was extended, and the press functioned in an effective manner.
Nor have the political branches shown themselves completely
unable to combat legislative prejudices and stereotypes-the second type of malfunction that- Ely identifies. Remedies for gender
discrimination have come as often from the political process as
from the judiciary. It was the political process, for example, that
eventually provided suffrage for women through the nineteenth
amendment. 15 Similarly, both after the Civil War and during the
past two decades, Congress intervened to curtail discrimination
against blacks that affected state political processes.11 6

114

One could, of course, contemplate a massive totalitarian suppression of speech, as-

sembly, and the franchise. Under those conditions, it would be difficult for the internal
functions of the political process to correct the suppressions. Bayonets and tanks could silence effective political dissension. But faced with such an extreme failure of democratic
institutions, the debate about the proper scope for judicial intervention would become moot,
since the judiciary would be powerless; the power of the judiciary depends on a functional
political process, see supra text following note 80.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. For a list of other legislation enacted to correct gender
discrimination, see infra note 195.
"I See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1982)); Voting Rights Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1982));
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a & note 2000h-6 (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1960,
Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. prec. § 831, §§ 1071, 1074,
1501, 1504; 19 U.S.C. § 1971 & note; 20 U.S.C. § 241, 260; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1974-1974e, 1975d
(1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 294-1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975 & note 1975e, 1995); Civil
Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 336, 337 (current version codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 243; 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), ch. 22, 17
Stat. 13 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 (1982)); Civil Rights Act of
1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1981, 1987, 1989-
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I do not mean to argue that political attempts to correct the
problems in the political process have been sufficient, or overwhelmingly attractive, or that they have left no significant role for
judicial intervention. I do contend that the political process is not
self-evidently or inevitably the least desirable choice for correcting
these problems-not when the choice is among imperfect alternatives. Since some correction can and does occur within the political
process, one cannot declare a priori that the judiciary is better
qualified to identify and correct a given political malfunction or
political malfunctions in general.
There seems to be a basic contradiction in Ely's perception of
judicial infirmities. Early in his book, Ely denounces those who
would have the judiciary make basic social value judgments and
details the inadequacies of the judiciary in making such judgments.11 He depicts a judiciary severely limited in its ability to
plumb the desires and needs of the populace-a judiciary clearly
inferior to the political process in its ability to determine social
policy. Given Ely's convincing demonstration of the limitations on
judicial capacity, it is hard to understand why the judiciary should
then be assigned the significant task that Ely assigns it simply by
default. Institutional choice by default is generally suspect and
seems plausible only when one institution is so clearly incapable of
performing a given task that it is inconceivable that it could perform at any acceptable level, or when the alternative institution is
overwhelmingly attractive and superior. Neither polar case seems
to be present here.
The problem with Ely's analysis and the source of the tension
in his theory should be evident. Ely has done institutional analysis
on only one institution at a time. First, he argues at length that,
given its inadequacies, the judiciary must be disqualified from deciding a range of social issues. Later, and without references to his
critique of the judiciary, he concludes that the political process
should also be disqualified from deciding a range of issues by reason of its malfunctions. Each institution is disqualified from a
realm of activity by its imperfections without regard to the limitations of the other institution in that same realm.
3. Substance and Process. In addition to the two-paragraph
institutional analysis I have just examined, Ely also argues that an
institutional allocation based on the substance/process distinction

1991 (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1986-1987, 1989-1992 (1982)).
"I See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 43-72.
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he advocates is reflected in the Constitution itself."1 $ Ely is basically correct, in my judgment, when he argues that the Constitution is, by its nature, predominantly concerned with the processes
of decisionmaking and the allocation of institutional responsibility
for the various tasks that make up that process. But does the nature of the Constitution support Ely's particular institutional allocation? Does the Constitution exclusively or even predominantly
allocate the task of policing the democratic process to the judiciary
while denying that institution any significant role in the determination of substance? I believe that an examination of the Constitution reveals a far richer range of institutional choice.
Ely sees the Constitution as "devoted almost entirely to structure,"11 9 by which he means provisions "explaining who among the
various actors-federal government, state government; Congress,
executive, judiciary-has authority to do what, and going on to fill
in a good bit of detail about how these persons are to be selected
and to conduct their business." 120 Ely's argument that much of the
Constitution is devoted to a definition of the rules of the game
and, therefore, to process seems cogent.21 But what does the Constitution tell us about the allocation of institutional responsibility
in general and the role of judicial review in particular? Does it allocate exclusively or predominantly to the Court the business of giving content to these "structural" provisions and never allocate that
task to the political branches? An affirmative answer to these questions does not follow from a reading of the document itself.
Many of the structural provisions of the Constitution are quite
specific. Congress may not decide, for example, that the terms of
its members shall be extended to ten years. But neither may the
Court decide that the terms of the members of Congress shall be
one year. Subject only to constitutional amendment, the framers
made an institutional choice designed to exclude any future decisionmaker-be it Congress, the executive, the states, or the judiciary-from making such a decision. While, as a general matter, such
exclusion sacrifices flexibility of decision because it does not allow
for variation over time, one can nevertheless imagine reasons for so
proceeding. The framers might well have envisioned that the facSee id. at 88-101.
Id. at 90.
220 Id.
121 Others have argued that even these "structural" provisions were intended to promote substance. See Tribe, supranote 99, at 1065-67. Tribe's position is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 187-201.
US

','
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tors bearing on a congressman's term of office were unlikely to
change, or they may have harbored grave doubts as to the trustworthiness of any of the available future decisionmakers. Indeed,
both of these reasons apply to such specific "structural clauses" as
those setting the minimum ages for holding the various political
offices and the terms of each office. Such matters could be arbitrarily specified without fear of significant future disadvantage. Moreover, as Ely so often points out, without such inflexibility actors
within the political process might manipulate the provisions to retain office. The framers' actual institutional choice denied all future institutions the power to alter those provisions.
In the case of other structural provisions, the framers chose to
allocate decisionmaking about process to the political branches
themselves. For example, each house of Congress judges the qualifications of its members and sets it own rules of procedure. 12 2 Vast
hierarchies of questionable merit, such as the congressional committee system, 123 have been built on this power. Similarly, the procedure for removing elected officials from office during their terms
in office by impeachment and trial is also left to the houses of
Congress." 4
On a more general level, the system of checks and balances
manifested in the separate political branches of the national government and the division of responsibility between national government and state government is a system of controls in which one
political entity is intended to control another. Thus, for example,
the commerce clause has been employed to curb, and has been
seen to reflect, fears about the parochial biases of the states as
decisionmakers.' 25 Ely persuasively justifies the judiciary's dormant commerce clause decisions as an effort to protect "voteless,"
out-of-state interests from such biases.2 ' The commerce clause in
121

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. This provision, of course, does not mean that there are no

limits on these powers or that the Court never plays a role. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 547-48 (1969) (denying congressional authority to exclude a member of the
Congress except upon grounds set out explicitly in the Constitution). As a general matter,
however, congressional qualifications and internal rules of procedure lie within the exclusive
control of the political branches.
113 For a detailed description of this system as well as a good compilation of materials
pertaining to it, see J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 17-21, 38-42.
124 U.S. CONST. art. H, §§ 2-3.
1,5See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
"I See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 83. Ely makes a similar argument about the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV. Id. He argues that state political processes by their
nature, exclude the out-of-state interests from representation. Therefore, the Court can act
under the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses to enforce "virtual representa-
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general, however, treats Congress, as well as the courts, as a correcting institution. The power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce was and is a basic institutional response to institutional
problems with state regulation. Thus, the voteless "out-of-staters"
are to be aided by two institutions, only one of which is outside the
political process.
While the Constitution reveals the framers' concern with institutional choice, it does not reflect an intention to remove all decisions designed to perfect the political process from the political
branches or allocate all or most of such decisions to the judiciary.
Some are simply fixed and beyond the control of any future decisionmaker, including the judiciary. Others are assigned to political
institutions, not to the judiciary. Although the Constitution is concerned with the policing of governmental processes, it does not
make the judiciary the sole or even the dominant institution to
carry out this function.
If decisions about process are not exclusively allocated to the
judiciary, what is to be said of the other feature of Ely's theory-his view that the political branches should decide all questions of substance? 127 Ely concedes that a few constitutional provisions take substantive decisions away from the political
branches,128 though these, he believes, are rare exceptions. Ely's
critics have argued that his class of exceptions should be expanded
to include a number of additional provisions,12 9 but the issues
which most dramatically reveal the assignment of difficult and important value judgments to the judiciary are the ones Ely himself
thinks safely within the process camp-equal protection and first
amendment protection of speech and press.1"'
Ely's view of the first amendment is simply stated: the first
amendment deals with speech-political speech predominantly-and with the press. These freedoms are basic to informed
political choice and, therefore, to the functioning of the political
process. Ely's notion that the first amendment concerns political

tion" of out-of-state interests as to state legislation that affects them. No one would claim
that citizens of state A should be entitled to vote in state B, but to the extent that the
legislative acts of state B affect the citizens of state A, there is a legislative malfunction that

the Court might correct.
17 See id. at 92-101.
Id. at 90-92.

128

" See, e.g., Lynch, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 860-61 (1980) (classifying the
third, fourth and eighth amendments as primarily substantive, and the fifth and sixth as a
mix of substantive and procedural).
130 See J. ELy, supra note 15, at 93-94, 98.

1984]

Taking Institutions Seriously

information and is linked to the political process certainly follows
a long tradition of constitutional interpretation. 13 1 Many speech
cases involve political speech, and many involve concerns about
the throttling of that speech by politicians adverse to the message.
Other commentators have broader conceptions of the meaning
of the first amendment,1 3 2 but even if one accepts Ely's narrower
view, there is still no escaping the fact that speech cases can require the judiciary to make difficult substantive decisions. First
amendment cases, after all, are not just speech or press cases; they
are also cases about national security, the raising of armies, violence in the streets, the orderly use of public thoroughfares, the
functioning of the judicial system, the privacy and morals of the
populace, and the education of the young.1"' In other words, they
implicate subjects normally assigned to the political branches. If
Ely were asked where these subjects belong in his constitutional
order and were not told that speech issues were also present, he
would surely respond that these are substantive matters involving
determinations of basic value judgments and should therefore be
assigned to the political branches. Nonetheless, in Ely's view, the
presence of a first amendment concern removes determinations
about these substantive matters from the political process and allocates them to the judiciary. If the judiciary is to protect speech
and thereby the integrity of the political process, it must often
make judgments about these underlying substantive issues. One
might, of course, take the absolutist position that the first amendment merely calls on the Court to see if speech is restricted and, if
it is, to strike down the legislation. But such a position is not consistent with Ely's interpretation of the first amendment, or with
the interpretation given the amendment by a majority of the
Court. 13 4 As a consequence, the judiciary must consider the import,
'1 See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22-27 (1948); A. MEiKLEJOHN, POLrrT-

107-24 (1960); Bork, Neutral
Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971); Kalven, The
New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
Sup. CT. REV. 191, 204-10; Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 23-25 (1975).
,31 Some would argue that a further purpose of the first amendment is the protection of
"personhood" or the dignity of individual thought. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 131, at
6; L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 905-10; Karst, supra note 131, at 25-26.
113 See cases cited infra notes 135-36.
I" Even if the Court were to take such an absolutist position, it would nevertheless be
true that substantive decisionmaking would be removed from the political process-decisionmaking, moreover, involving subjects beyond speech and press. Thus, the institutional choice implicit in even the absolutist position takes from the political branches
CAL FREEDOM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:366

weight, and validity of substantive values or interests. The Court is
called upon to review decisions that balance speech interests with
such interests as protection against violence in the streets, 383 7the
38 and national security.
orderly functioning of schoolrooms,

It

must deal with substance in order to guard the process.
It is important for two reasons to understand that first amendment cases encompass both questions of process and substance, as
Ely uses those terms. First, the observation suggests that it is the
nature of the Constitution to assign certain difficult substantive
tasks to the judiciary, albeit in part because of defects in the political process. Second, if these are difficult substantive issues, and if
Ely is correct when he argues that the judiciary is far from perfect
or even severely defective as a substantive decisionmaker, then it is
no longer sufficient to argue that the Constitution ought to assign
these tasks to the judiciary simply on the basis of defects in the
political process. By Ely's own arguments, both institutions are severely defective. Therefore, assignment of the task on the a priori
basis of political malfunction is insufficient. Either as description
or prescription, Ely's analysis of institutional decisionmaking responsibility remains incomplete.
A look at Ely's other core subject-the representation of minorities and its grounding in the equal protection clause-yields
similar conclusions. According to Ely, the equal protection clause is
meant to correct a problem with the legislative process: classifications based on prejudice, whether deriving from open hostility or
from self-serving stereotypes. Either because they are members of
the majority or because they serve the wishes of the majority, political representatives often fail to represent those groups against
whom this prejudice is directed. Despite this element of failure of
process, equal protection cases, like first amendment cases, require
the judiciary to make important and difficult substantive determinations. Equal protection cases can and do involve a broad range
of social issues. Prejudice, after all, may lie behind any form of
legislation. Categorization, classification, and differentiation are
the core of social policymaking. If policy is to be made, the political branches must differentiate among groups. The identification
of a serious prejudice that influences the political process only tells
substantive authority that Ely sees as generally belonging to them. See supra notes 83-88
and accompanying text (discussing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
'35 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
136 See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
137 See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
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us that there is a tendency to underrepresent certain interests. But
it is entirely possible that the same decision might have been produced by an unbiased processS3--a process, in Ely's terms, untainted by hostility or self-serving stereotypes. Who, then, is to decide whether a classification emanating from the defective political
process is to stand? If, as Ely believes, a showing of prejudice
should shift the burden to the government to demonstrate that the
same policy decision would have resulted even if no such motive
had existed, the judiciary is left with the obligation of making the
basic classification decision.
The government can usually rationalize the outcome in unbiased terms, if only because most controversial and important policy decisions involve legitimate concerns on each side; in Hampton,
for example, the government raised concerns about foreign affairs
and foreign policy. 13 9 Once the government has raised a colorable
nonprejudicial explanation, the courts must then determine
whether the considerations presented by the government outweigh
the detrimental effects of the legislation. That determination is a
substantive one, much like the determination the legislature was
supposed to have made. In the extreme, if the courts cannot easily
assess the validity of these arguments, they are then faced with the
Scharpf dilemma discussed earlier:1 40 either they must accede to
the government's arguments and thereby diminish the protection
of minorities, or they must dismiss the government's arguments
and thereby risk the invalidation of worthwhile legislation. In such
cases, the courts are faced with difficult substantive decisions. In
allocating the decisionmaking responsibility, the ability of the judiciary to make the substantive decision in question must be
weighed against the demonstrated disability of the political
branches.
Ely is correct, in my view, when he asserts that the Constitution basically serves to allocate decisionmaking responsibility
rather than to impose specific substantive results. He also is correct when he argues that problems with the political process are
and should be important in determining that allocation. But
neither the nature of the Constitution nor Ely's institutional analy138

This realization comes through in the Court's cryptic footnote 21 in Village of Ar-

lington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977), where the
Court noted that proof that the village was motivated by prejudice does not automatically

require invalidation of its actions if the same action would have resulted absent prejudicial
purpose.

See supra text accompanying note 55.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
139
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sis indicates that the judiciary is or should be given all and only
tasks of policing the political process. Whether the judiciary is better or worse than the political branches at these tasks is not necessarily decided by the fact that the political branches are imperfect
or even highly imperfect. The political branches, clearly, will never
correct themselves in an ideal or perfect manner (however that
ideal is defined), but the important question, as I have stressed
repeatedly, is whether they will do a better or worse job of correction-that is, of deciding substantive decisions associated with
speech or classification issues-than will the also highly defective
judiciary.
Neither is it obvious that the judicial response should be limited to correction of the political process. Suppose, after all the
corrective efforts of the judiciary, political process defects still remain-as they surely will. Is it obvious that the judiciary should
never respond to legislation emanating from the still defective political process by substituting its own, admittedly imperfect judgment? Perhaps, as Ely's analysis would suggest, it is true that the
Court should confine itself to processes-implicating issues such as
voting or speech while steering clear of a substantive issue such as
abortion. But if Ely is correct, his conclusion does not follow solely
from his institutional analysis. More careful consideration of the
relative abilities of the institutions in question than has so far
been undertaken is necessary before the question posed above can
be answered.
There is one further problem with Ely's institutional argument. To Ely, "malfunctions" in the political branches are the basis for judicial intervention. While, in my view, such malfunction
alone is not a sufficient condition to determine when and how to
intervene, it is an important feature of a comparative institutional
analysis. Malfunction in the political branches, however, is not
necessarily limited to the two forms Ely identifies, namely, attempts by those in power to choke off the channels of political
change and the systematic disadvantaging of some minority out of
simple hostility or prejudice. Since we are concerned here with laying the groundwork for future institutional analysis, it is important
to see that however important the political malfunctions Ely identifies may be, they do not constitute a closed set.1"1 In an effort to
Il Even Ely's definitions of his two forms of political malfunction reveal analytical
problems that will require careful consideration in future efforts at institutional analysis.
Consider Ely's view that the protection of speech stems from the first form of malfunction,
distrust of the desire of "ins" to stay in. See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 103. This desire does
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illustrate this point and to explore further the limits of Ely's insti-

not identify malfunction in the political process as such. That "ins" wish to stay in is a
normal feature of politics-not necessarily a malfunction. This desire to retain elective office
is what makes officials responsive to the electorate.
Elected representatives may want to suppress free speech for their own selfish interests,
but they also may want to take money from the treasury or regulate commerce or lay taxes
for their own selfish interests. That they would want to do so does not mean that they can.
Ely would argue that misappropriation of funds or favoritism in legislation would in general
be deterred by the fear of losing office. But wouldn't the same fear curb invasion of free
speech? Isn't favoritism in the granting of a license to a butcher the same as favoritism in
the granting of a license to print and publish? All this potential selfish misbehavior is serious. Why is one type a form of malfunction for which we need judicial intervention, whereas
another is not?
It is true that suppression of speech or press deprives the public of something that is
valuable to them as participants in the political process. Income or jobs may not so directly
implicate political activity. But if the public would rise up and vote out anyone who curtailed its access to information, the self-interested elected representative would not dare
attempt to do so. This point must be qualified, of course, by the recognition that if access to
information is curtailed, voters may not know enough to protect themselves at the polls.
Ely needs more than a reference to the selfish desires of the "ins." It is likely that the
subjects of speech and the press-important as they are to the functioning of the process of
making public policy-are poorly handled by the political branches because concern for
them is unequally distributed among the population. It may be that the majority of the
population does not well appreciate the value of speech or press; if speech is highly valued
only by a few, then the "ins" can take their selfish advantage by curtailing speech with little
fear of reprisal at the ballot box.
Ely's second form of malfunction-hostile or prejudicial refusal to recognize and represent the interests of minorities, see id.-comes closer to recognizing that something more
than a theory of selfish motives is needed to explain the shortcomings of the political process. Here the malfunction is tied more closely to the majoritarian nature of politics. If an
elected representative were hostile toward, or held self-serving stereotypes about, a politically powerful group, we would expect any resulting misbehavior to be well controlled by the
electoral process. The existence of hostility or stereotypes is not the dominant problem; a
significant risk that misbehavior would go uncorrected by the political process must also be
present.
If our elected representatives were all altruistic, sensitive, introspective and honest, we
perhaps would have no malfunction. But our failure to achieve this ideal is not enough to
produce malfunction in a political process that contains checks and balances and recourse to
the vote. There must also be defects in the correcting mechanisms. A perfectly functioning
political process does not require god-like elected officials.
Furthermore, if the malfunction lies in the inadequacies of the political process in general and can be traced to such problems as inadequate recognition or representation of interests in the process, it is a far more pervasive defect than Ely recognizes. There can be
political malfunctions which are not tied to the failure to represent minorities. For example,
there are instances in which minorities can be overrepresented. The notion of special interest legislation or of administrative agencies "captured" by the regulated group reflects the
overrepresentation of minority interests. This is a subject I consider in more depth infra
notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
Even if the sole form of malfunction were the underrepresentation of minorities, that
underrepresentation does not operate only in the regulation of speech and press or in the
explicit classification of traditional minorities. Women who wish the freedom to have an
abortion or people who wish to have sexual intercourse out of wedlock or with members of
the same gender may also constitute groups underrepresented in the legislative process. In-
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tutional analysis, I turn now to consideration of the case from
which Ely derives his conception of political malfunction.
B.

The Scope of Judicial Review: The Carolene Products Choices

In United States v. Carotene Products Co."4 2 the Court applied minimal scrutiny to uphold the economic legislation before it.
CaroleneProducts was one of several cases which signaled the end
of the era of economic due process during which, for three decades,
the Court had invalidated a broad range of economic legislation it
felt interfered unduly with the freedom of contract. But the case is
most famous for the fourth footnote in Justice Stone's opinion
which suggested instances when more than minimal judicial scru143
tiny might be expected.
In Ely's view this footnote captures the essence of what judicial review ought to be and, to a substantial degree, what judicial
review since that case has been; it epitomizes concern with political

deed, when a state outlaws abortion or homosexuality or cohabitation, the legislation actually threatens only a small group, though it has the appearance of generality; in such a case,
the legislative malfunction in question may be even less likely to be controlled by other
elements in the political process than when a small group is singled out explicitly.
142 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
143 There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 369-370; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibi.tions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73; on restraints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14, 718-20, 722; Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra;on interferences with political organizations,
see Stromberg v. California, supra, 369; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J.,
in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farringtonv.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 484, or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon, supra;Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
428; South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n. 2, and cases cited.
Id. at 152 n.4.
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malfunction as the basis of judicial review. In the footnote's second
paragraph, Ely finds judicial concern about legislation that ob14 4
structs political activities such as voting, speech, and assembly.
In its third paragraph, he finds judicial concern about legislation
directed at politically weak minorities.'45
I agree that the Carolene Products footnote does relate
heightened judicial review to certain forms of political malfunction. But it does not provide such scrutiny for all forms of political
malfunction. In particular, it omits a form of political malfunction
that has a serious claim to attention in both political theory and
history: the overrepresentation of concentrated special interests.
Not only does the footnote omit mention of this form of political
malfunction, but, in the case before it, the Court applied a minimal
standard of review to legislation that was probably the product of
a legislative process subject to exactly this malfunction.
The Court's decision in CaroleneProducts, thus, does not recognize the need for judicial review in the full array of cases where
serious political malfunction exists. As such, Ely's theory of judicial review, which bases the role of the judiciary on the existence of
serious malfunction in the political process, can neither explain nor
justify the CaroleneProducts decision. But while Ely's theory cannot evaluate Carolene Products, a more truly comparative institutional theory can. I shall consider this theme in greater depth both
to aid in understanding the limitations of Ely's approach, and to
explore a form of legislative malfunction-overrepresentation of
certain minorities-that has not been much examined in the existing constitutional law literature.146
The legislation at issue in Carolene Products banned the interstate sale of "filled milk," or skim milk supplemented with
nonmilk fats such as coconut oil. 147 Congress and many state legis-

latures had banned this product, ostensibly because it was
"adulterated" by the nonmilk additions, which provided less vitamin A than did butterfat. Although the Pure Food and Drug Act

48

already required that imitations or blends be labeled as such and
J. ELY, supra note 15, at 76-77.
Id.
146 There has been some discussion of this form of malfunction in the context of the
dormant commerce clause. See Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979
144
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Wis. L. REv. 125.
147

See Filled Milk Act of 1923, Pub. L. No. 67-513, 42 Stat. 1486 (codified at 21 U.S.C.

§§ 61-63 (1982)).
IdS See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, §2, 34 Stat. 768, 768
(repealed 1938).
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given a unique brand name to avoid confusion with the generic
product, Congress prohibited sales of filled milk ostensibly because
retail dealers were promoting the product either as identical to
pure milk or as the equivalent of pure milk, and because the product also was being sold in bulk to boarding houses and ice cream
manufacturers, who in turn supplied it to a public that believed it
was receiving pure milk or pure milk ice cream. 14 9
It does not take much scrutiny to see the dairy lobby at work
behind the passage and enforcement of the "filled milk" act.15 Indeed, the dairy industry's efforts to employ legislation to keep
"adulterated" products from grocery shelves and vending booths
have a long history, extending from before Lochner v. New York15 1
to the present. 152 It is not too uncharitable, perhaps, to suggest
that concern for the dairies' pocketbooks rather than for the consumer's health best explains the dairy lobby's efforts. In fact,
though the filled milk legislation seemed to be aimed at helping
consumers, it may have harmed them. They were "saved" from
"adulterated" products, but only at the cost of higher prices, while
the dairy industry benefited from reduced competition.153
Special interest legislation obviously is not limited to dairy
products, nor to the period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the contrary, fear of capture of the political process by the few has been an important concern since well before
the time of the framers.5 Along with the fear of monarchy and

1"9

See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 148-51 & nn.2-3.

150 See, e.g., 67 CONG. REC. 4981-82 (1923) (statement of Sen. Stanley that bill was a

"plain attempt to utilize the dread powers of legislation to destroy one business in order to
foster another"). The bill's sponsor felt obliged to note that the measure had the support of
more than 30 dairy and farming groups. Id. at 3949-50 (statement of Sen. Ladd).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
192 For general commentary on the history of the dairy lobby, see M. KELLER, AFFAIRS
OF STATE 413 (1977); R. LEE, A HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAXATION 12-27 (1973); J. vAN
STUYVENBERG, Aspects of Government Intervention, in MANRGAWnE: AN ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC HISTORY, 1869-1969, at 281 (J. van Stuyvenberg ed. 1969).
1M3 See M. KELLER, supra note 152, at 413-14.
194 In England, concern over preference for the privileged few in the form of the grant
of monopolies by the Crown was a substantial source of complaint in the seventeenth century and had its role in leading to the constitutional reforms of that century. The following
passage reflects the pervasiveness of the problem:
Monopolies aroused most hostility. Often there were good reasons for protecting
new industries by giving them a guaranteed market for a period of years. ...
But too
often selling monopolies became a means of solving the government's fiscal problems.
Monopolies were obtainable only by those with court influence. Thus the pin-makers,
of humble origin, had to bribe courtiers to get a charter of incorporation. The courtiers
in consequence acquired real control of the new company. In 1612 the Earl of Salisbury
was receiving £ 7,000 a year from the silk monopoly, the Earl of Suffolk £ 5,000 from
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aristocracy came a fear of any governmental form that placed
power within the grasp of a privileged few. The post-Revolutionary-War state constitutions reflected a suspicion of strong governors, senates, or upper houses. 5 From the 1830's, state constitutional reforms showed distrust of legislatures not immediately in
touch with the wishes of the populace. 156 Jacksonians worried
about the capture of the political process by the privileged few,

currants, the Earl of Northampton £ 4,500 from starch. On a humbler scale, Sir Edmund Verney had a share in one monopoly for inspecting tobacco, in another for hackney coaches and in a third 'for sealing woolen yarn before it was sold or wrought into
cloth'.
In 1601 a member of Parliament asked, when a list of monopolies was read out, 'Is
not bread there?' His irony exaggerated only slightly. It is difficult for us to picture to
ourselves the life of a man living in a house built with monopoly bricks, with windows
(if any) of monopoly glass; heated by monopoly coal (in Ireland monopoly timber),
burning in a grate made of monopoly iron ....
He washed himself with monopoly
soap, his clothes in monopoly starch. He dressed in monopoly lace, monopoly linen,
monopoly leather, monopoly gold thread. His hat was of monopoly beaver, with a monopoly band. His clothes were held up by monopoly belts, monopoly buttons, monopoly
pins. They were dyed with mouopoly dyes. He ate monopoly butter, monopoly currants, monopoly red herrings, monopoly salmon and monopoly lobsters. His food was
seasoned with monopoly salt, monopoly pepper, monopoly vinegar. Out of monopoly
glasses he drank monopoly wines and monopoly spirits; out of pewter mugs made from
monopoly tin he drank monopoly beer made from monopoly hops, kept in monopoly
barrels or monopoly bottles, sold in monopoly-licensed ale-houses. He smoked monopoly tobacco in monopoly pipes, played with monopoly dice or monopoly cards, or on
monopoly lute-strings. He wrote with monopoly pens, on monopoly writing-paper; read
(through monopoly spectacles, by the light of monopoly candles) monopoly printed
books, including monopoly Bibles and monopoly Latin grammars, printed on paper
made from monopoly-collected rags, bound in sheepskin dressed in monopoly alum. He
shot with monopoly gunpowder made from monopoly saltpetre. He travelled in monopoly sedan chairs or monopoly hackney coaches, drawn by horses fed on monopoly hay.
He tipped with monopoly farthings. At sea he was lighted by monopoly lighthouses.
When he made his will, he went to a monopolist. (In Ireland one could not be born,
married, or die without 6d to a monopolist.) Pedlars were licensed by a monopolist.
Mice were caught in monopoly mousetraps. Not all these patents existed at once, but
all come from the first four decades of the seventeenth century. In 1621 there were
alleged to be 700 of them.
Apart possibly from beer and salt, these were not quite necessities. But monopolies
added to the price of just those semi-luxuries which were beginning to come within the
reach of yeomen and artisans whose standard of living was rising. They affected the
dally life of hundreds of thousands of Englishmen.

C. HELL,

THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION,

1603-1714, at 31-33 (1961) (footnote omitted). This

passage suggests that the mass of the populace as consumers bore the brunt of these special
privileges while the few close to the Crown gained, even if the monopolies often were
granted ostensibly to promote laudable ends.
155 See G. WOOD, THa CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 135, 237-44
(1969).
156 See M. MEYERs, THE JACKSONAN PERSUASION 255-56 (1957).
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especially organized and influential commercial interests. 15 7 This
Jacksonian populist bent also was felt in the post-Civil-War era,
which saw a flourishing of political machines, graft, and special interest legislation. " " At least some of the laissez-faire philosophy of
the day reflected a fear of these corrupt political processes. 159 The
post-Civil-War Supreme Court also evinced misgivings about legislation promoted by special interests.10 °
In short, fear of the few has accompanied a fear of the many
throughout our history. Yet while Ely and others take account of
the tyranny of the majority, which concerned the framers and still
concerns us today, they ignore an equally insistent theme in our
history: the overrepresentation of certain minority interests and
the consequent need for protection of the majority.
I am not arguing, nor do I believe, that the CaroleneProducts
Court was wrong not to intervene in reaction to a possible minoritarian bias. My point is that the Court's choice cannot be justified on the ground that there is no risk of a serious political malfunction in the passage of social and economic legislation such as
that considered in the case. Consequently, a theory of judicial review based, as is Ely's, on reaction to political malfunction, seems
inadequate to justify the CaroleneProducts Court's distinction between the case before it and cases such as those mentioned in the
famous footnote. Neither can such a theory explain the Court's approach to judicial review thereafter.
One could argue, of course, that the form of political malfunction I have identified is either easily corrected within the political
process itself or relatively unimportant.e' Under a simple conception of majority rule, it would be difficult to conceive of the overrepresentation of minority interests at the expense of the majority.
Consumers outnumber and have more votes than the producers
who desire to make monopoly profits at their expense. How do the
fewer votes command the larger share of political attention?
To answer this question, one must observe an important charSee id. passim.
See M. KELLER, supra note 152, at 167, 242-47, 257, 271, 522-25.
188 See M. MEYas, supra note 156, at 12.
160 Justice Field, who was a major actor in shaping the movement toward the strong
intervention of the Lochner era, apparently was strongly influenced by his perception of the
corrupting effect of special interests in the commercial legislation of the time. See McCurdy,
Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HisT. 970, 976-77, 981 (1975).
"I1Thus, one might argue that the various factions compete in the political "marketplace" and that the political process, like the ideal market, yields optimal solutions. For a
summary, and a critique of this pluralist position, see T. Lowi, supra note 2, at 41-54.
157

188
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acteristic of the majority involved in this sort of legislation: each
individual consumer has but a small stake in each piece of legislation. It is the aggregate impact on all consumers of a particular
statute and the aggregate impact on each consumer of all such legislation that can be substantial. Each statute is, in effect, an excise
or sales tax on a particular consumer good. When aggregated for all
the goods and services consumed by any consumer, the impact of
these implicit sales taxes can be great.16 2 Yet a consumer's stake in
any single piece of such legislation is so low that it does not justify
the consumer's spending the resources needed to monitor the political process, determine whether the legislation is unfavorable to
that consumer, present counter arguments, or organize political efforts. The interests of producers, by contrast, may be lower in the
aggregate, but because these interests are more concentrated and
more easily recognizable by the producers, they lead to more and
better organized political activity. 6 " As a consequence, the interests of producers will receive disproportionate weight in the legislative process and the interests of consumers will be accordingly
underrepresented.
On both historical and theoretical grounds, then, overrepresentation of concentrated interests appears to be a serious malfunction in our legislative process. If, as Ely's theory suggests, the
existence of a serious political malfunction is a sufficient ground
for judicial intervention, then the Carolene Products Court should
not have employed minimal scrutiny in the case before it and
should have added a fourth paragraph to its famous footnote, adding this malfunction to its catalogue. From a comparative institutional standpoint, however, the existence of political malfunction is
not a sufficient basis for judicial intervention. There are indeed
quite plausible institutional grounds for the Carolene Products
Court's choice to provide only minimal scrutiny to cases like the
one before it. A staggering task would confront a judiciary that intervened in all instances in which a dormant majority was ex' The aggregate effect of the seventeenth-century monopolies in England is reflected
in the passage quoted supra note 154. Modem special interest legislation is perhaps more
subtle, but it is also more pervasive. Although seventeenth-century monopolies were apparently not granted on necessities (aside from beer and salt), see supra note 154, the "filled
milk" legislation itself suggests that twentieth-century special interest legislation affects
even the most basic products.
'1 For an economist's version of this analysis, see Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGorT. Sci. 3 (1971). The problem need not be limited to
defects in the achievement of efficient resource allocation. The underrepresentation of consumers is also a serious obstacle to equality in the distribution of resources or in the treatment of individuals, since it is the poor who are most likely to suffer here.
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ploited by an active, concentrated special interest, because the potential for such a configuration of interests is pervasive, not limited
even to economic regulation.' Every legislative issue, from economic regulation to the provision of public services to the control
of the environment, stimulates politicking by groups. In many instances, these organized efforts may only be feasible on one side of
the issue, thereby creating the defect in question.
As I noted previously,6 5 a defect in the legislative process
means that legislatures have a tendency to legislate more favorably
to the overrepresented interest than they would were the process
nondefective. It certainly does not follow, however, that a nondefective legislature would produce no legislation favorable to that
interest. Considering the broad range of legislative issues that
might be infected by special interest bias, the judiciary does not
have the luxury of strictly scrutinizing all legislation which may be
tainted.
One can see the problems confronting the Court particularly
well in the context of economic regulations. Even among free market advocates, there are few who argue that all regulation of market activity is bad (whatever one's criteria of badness). While
many may argue that there is a tendency toward overregulation
because of the unchecked, or underchecked, desires of producers to
limit competition, it hardly follows that a well-balanced or perfectly functioning political process would never regulate economic
activity. Serious informational problems, external effects on third
parties, monopolistic elements, as well as concern about wealth distribution and its impact, may prompt legislative intervention. It is
extremely difficult for any outside observer to determine whether
the justification for intervention is sufficient.
Such difficulty does not derive simply from a lack of technical
expertise. It is common enough for constitutional scholars to make
reference to the Court's lack of expertise about economic affairs, as
though nine economists in robes would be ideal decisionmakers.
Experts can provide a list of considerations, but the most difficult
task is to determine the weight each consideration should have in
the final decision. It is not an easy task, for example, to decide
whether filled milk should be prohibited. Even if a court were able
164 For example, federal and state taxpayers usually suffer a per capita loss of only a

few cents from a tax provision that profits a special interest. Again, although the aggregate
impact on taxpayers as a whole is significant, the taxpayer's position is likely to be poorly
represented because of his low per capita loss and lack of organization.
165 See supra text accompanying note 138.
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to identify the degree to which safety and health would be improved, it would have to find a method for.weighing the value of
that improvement against the decline in consumer buying power
that would result from prohibition. The method of the market is to
look to the preferences of consumers as revealed in transactions for
the items involved. As we have noted, however, that market too
may be severely defective. Similarly, the method of the political
process is to look to voting or lobbying as it affects the views of
legislators desiring to retain office. But as we have also noted, that
process may be defective if one interest is overrepresented. Nonetheless, if the judiciary is to substitute for either of these two
mechanisms, it must find a method of its own.
The era of economic due process taught us important lessons
about the institutional limitations of the judiciary-lessons that
may explain and justify the CaroleneProducts choice to limit judicial review of economic legislation severely and to omit from the
catalogue of footnote four the problem of overrepresentation and
special interests. In Lochner v. New York 6 6 and subsequent
cases,16 7 the Court employed criteria that mimicked notions of
market failure or malfunction: monopoly, incapacity, and impacts
on third parties not involved in the particular contract or market
transactions. The Court apparently thought that such criteria provided a workable means for it to identify allowable legislative interventions into the market. But as any student of introductory
economics knows, these effects are likely to exist in virtually any
setting. Product differentiation, incomplete or imperfect information, and externalities are pervasive. The market-like all institutions-is always and inevitably imperfect.
During the Lochner era, the Court took upon itself to decide
when these imperfections in the market were severe enough to justify government intervention. The Court assumed the task of making policy decisions over a broad range of social issues, thereby inviting the dense and voluminous submissions introduced by Louis
6 9 The Brandeis brief, with its exBrandeis 68 in Muller v. Oregon.'
tensive survey of socioeconomic data and opinion, was the logical
response to the broad-based task undertaken by the Court' 7q--a
198 U.S. 45 (1905).

's'

See infra note 171 and cases cited therein.
115 See Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), reprinted
"6

in 16

LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT. CONST rTIONAL LAW

(P. Kurland &G. Casper ed. 1975).
-6,208 U.S. 412 (1908).
170

See Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 VAND. L. REv. 783, 789-90 (1958).
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task at which it tried its hand for more than three decades. The
results seemed to show the strain. There were abrupt and unexplained shifts in the formulation and application of central doctrines, doctrines that the Court
itself admitted were virtually im17 1
possible to define and apply.

The dramatic economic fluctuations of the 1930's-bringing
with them an outpouring of economic legislation along with indications that market imperfections were perhaps more complex and
more pervasive than the Court had previously thought-signaled
the end of its efforts. The legislative process need not have looked
any more trustworthy than it ever had to explain this change in
M'In Lochner itself, the Court invalidated maximum-hour legislation in the baking industry although it had shortly before approved such legislation with respect to the mining
industry in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 396-97 (1898). Within a few years, it made an
exception to the invalidity of maximum-hour legislation for instances where it applied particularly to women in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908). Not much later, the
Court allowed maximum-hour legislation virtually across the board without even noting that
it was overruling Lochner. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 437-39 (1917).
Over the same period the Court's decisions on the related subject of the validity of
minimum-wage legislation showed the opposite progression. The Court had upheld federal
minimum-wage legislation in 1916, Wilson v. New York, 243 U.S. 332, 359 (1916), upheld
state minimum-wage legislation in 1917, Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per
curiam), aff'g by an equally divided court 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743 (1914), and Simpson v.
O'Hara, 70 Or. 261, 141 P. 158 (1914), invalidated federal minimum-wage legislation in 1923,
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560-62 (1923), and appeared to do the same for
state legislation under the authority of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, in 1925 and 1927.
Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (per curiam); Murphy v. Sardell, 269
U.S. 530 (1925) (per curiam).
The trend for the Court's treatment of minimum-wage legislation was not only inconsistent with the pattern of maximum-hour cases, it was also apparently confusing. When, in
1937, the Court finally upheld minimum-wage laws (after apparently invalidating a similar
law the previous year in Moorehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936)),
the Washington statute it upheld had been in existence for twenty years. See West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937).
During the entire era, the Court limited regulation of prices and rates to businesses
"affected with a public interest." From its inception in the pre-Lochner case of Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-26, 133-35 (1877), to its death nearly 60 years later in Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-39 (1934), this central concept remained a mystery. The Court
flirted with the idea of monopoly as a defining element, but it did not consistently adhere to
this criterion. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 538. The test was adopted in Munn, virtually abandoned in Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 402-04 (1894), questioned in
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929), and briefly resurrected in Tagg Bros.
v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1930). For a time, the Court also spoke of a business's impact on the general public, see Munn, 94 U.S. at 126, but it eventually abandoned
this unwieldy concept, see Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 (1927). The Court
found itself regularly admitting that the "public interest" test was difficult to explain and
apply, see, e.g., Tyson, 273 U.S. at 430; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 355 (1928), but it
kept trying to employ it. Finally, in Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536, the Court conceded that there
could be no "closed class" of businesses "affected with a public interest"; all businesses of
any importance affect the public.
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the Court's stance. The Court need only have been less sure than
before that questions about the propriety of governmental intervention in the market could be framed to match the judiciary's
limited resources, or that the judiciary was obviously superior to
the imperfect political process at structuring regulation of the
market.
This brief treatment of the end of the era of economic due
process suggests that the Court's choice, evident in Carolene Products, to scrutinize economic legislation less rigorously than it had
during the Lochner era cannot be assessed fully without regard for
both the substantive goals of the decisionmakers, and the relative
172
institutional capacities of the political and judicial branches.

171 I have suggested that the rise and fall of economic due process may reflect perceptions of relative institutional efficacy. The Court of the Lochner era seems to have reflected
concerns about legislative malfunction both in the form of underrepresentation of the propertied minority and in the form of overrepresentation of concentrated commercial interests.
The era may have ended solely because, in the 1930's, the Court changed its views about
which malfunctions existed or were important. There is certainly evidence that the
Roosevelt Court was more concerned with racial and ethnic intolerance in the political process than with intolerance or favoritism resulting from economic power. For a comprehensive examination of social trends in the 1930's as reflected in the views of some of the Justices, see Bixby, supra note 80, at 761-79.
It is not as clear, however, that the members of the Roosevelt Court became wholly
sanguine about the dangers of special interest legislation. Roosevelt-era Justices such as
Douglas and Black, of course, appeared to be quite unconcerned about economic legislation
even when the marks it bore of special interests were quite clear. See, e.g., Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (Douglas, J.); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)
(Black, J.). But such indifference does not necessarily signal a lack of distrust of the legislative process. The experience of the economic due process era, after all, also taught strong
lessons about the limitations of judicial ability. Those lessons, rather than a new-found faith
in economic legislation, may explain this "hands-off" stance.
In fact, there are indications that the judiciary has continued to harbor a distrust of
special-interest economic legislation. In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), for example,
the Warren Court examined Illinois legislation that had imposed financial responsibility requirements on businesses issuing money orders but had exempted one named company,
American Express, from the requirement. This case represents the sole instance since the
1930's in which the equal protection clause has been used to strike down special-interest
economic regulation-a fact that reflects, perhaps, the flagrancy of the legislation. A single
entity of significant stature and financial resources received explicit special treatment. It is
difficult not to distrust such legislation.
As the history of economic due process suggests, however, a manageable judicial reaction to that distrust is difficult. In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976),
the Burger Court overruled Morey. In Dukes, the Court was asked to invalidate a New
Orleans ordinance which excluded pushcart food vendors from the French Quarter but
which grandfathered in those who had operated for more than eight years. The lower court
had relied on Morey in invalidating the law. Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706,
711-13 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court, however, retreated to its usual deferential standard, see, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963), for reviewing economic regulation. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04. In principle, Morey could have
been distinguished on institutional grounds: the one party exempted from the statutory re-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:366

Members of the Carolene Products Court may have been motivated by any number of objectives ranging from more equality in
the allocation of material resources, or more equality in the treatment of individuals, or more efficiency in the allocation of resources, to greater consistency with the will of the people or the
will of the framers. But whether the Court's decision in Carolene
Products serves any of these goals depends in significant part on
whether the allocation of decisionmaking power among institutions
was correct. Only careful attention to institutional realities will
yield an answer to that latter question.
The Carolene Products footnote is a good place to begin a
careful analysis of relative institutional competence. In those few
words, a court struggling with the confines of judicial review proquirement was an entity so large and sophisticated as almost to compel the conclusion that
its interest had been given undue weight in the legislative process. Yet such a distinction
only serves to emphasize the continuous nature of the spectrum of potential special-interest
influence and the ease with which federal courts, unable to draw administrative lines, might
be drawn into reviewing the broad range of economic regulations. The lower court in Dukes
no doubt suspected legislative malfunction, see Dukes, 501 F.2d at 713, and the Court may
well have shared that suspicion, but it may also have seen the broader implications of
strictly scrutinizing the statute in question.
That the Burger Court, despite Dukes, is not itself immune from the temptation to
strike at special-interest legislation can be seen in its treatment of commercial speech. The
leading case here is Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), decided the same year as Dukes. The Court invalidated a Virginia
law that prohibited pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. Because it saw
the case as presenting a first amendment problem, the Court's close scrutiny of the legislation is not surprising. But political speech, or even cultural speech, was not involved. Therefore, the case cannot easily be placed within Ely's political process rationale or even within
the broader individual self-realization rationale. Notice, however, that the legislation was a
garden variety of economic regulation, a classic example of a restriction on competition. The
Virginia Pharmacy dissent, and many commentators have suggested that the case is a
throwback to economic due process. 425 U.S. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Baker, CommercialSpeech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1, 4-5 &
n.22 (1976); Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32-34 (1977); Jackson
& Jeffries, CommercialSpeech: Economic Due Processand the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L.
REv. 1, 25-41 (1979).
As Morey and Virginia Pharmacy suggest, in neither the Warren nor the Burger years
has the Court entirely lost its distrust of economic regulation. But the mode by which the
recent Court has entered the arena of commercial regulation deserves special emphasis. It
has sought to limit the range of economic regulation the judiciary will need to review. The
first amendment aspect of Virginia Pharmacy,for example, provides a line of demarcation.
Even limiting itself to speech cases, however, the Court faces a considerable range of commercial regulation. In subsequent cases, accordingly, the Court has sought to establish the
boundaries of the Virginia Pharmacydoctrine. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-66, 569-71 (1980) (advertising by public utility
protected); Friedman v. Rodgers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) (use of trade name by optometrist
not protected); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (price advertising by lawyers
protected); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (real estate "for
sale" signs protected). Virginia Pharmacy may yet go the way of Morey v. Doud.
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vided insights about that struggle. Ely, moreover, has expanded
upon these insights to provide an institutionally-based theory of
judicial review. He correctly perceives that concern about the limits of the political process is a basic theme of constitutional analysis, evident in the Constitution and in its interpretation by the
Warren Court. Through this lens he offers insights into many facets of constitutional law.
But Ely stops too soon. The Carolene Products footnote,
whatever its value, is incomplete. It identifies defects in the political process that are important but that do not reflect the complete
range of important potential political malfunctions. That the footnote did not provide an exhaustive list is understandable given its
purpose. It was meant to suggest in only a preliminary way certain
circumstances in which the judiciary might expend its limited resources in close examination of legislation.1 73 It may be that after
careful institutional comparison Ely's basic conclusions will hold.
It may turn out that the judiciary should react only to the two
forms of political malfunction he names and in only the manner he
indicates; perhaps he is correct that the judiciary should not concern itself with either the regulation of commerce or the regulation
of morals. But if Ely is correct, it will not be because serious political malfunction is obviously absent from either of these excluded
areas or because the judiciary is self-evidently the decisionmaker
of choice for the vast range of issues to be decided in the areas he
allocates to them. Any such conclusions must rest on an institutional comparison more complete than his theory of judicial review
gives us.

III.

THE ROLE OF JuDIcIAL REASONING: THE APPROACHES OF
HARRY WELLINGTON AND MICHAEL PERRY

Several constitutional scholars, in an effort to define the scope
of judicial review, emphasize the disinterested, contemplative, and
neutral nature of judicial decisionmaking in contrast to the passionate, self-interested hurly-burly of the legislative process. To
observe as much is to make an institutional argument. From these
institutional generalizations, these authors draw broad conclusions
about the appropriate allocation of government decisionmaking.
They assign moral or principled inquiry to the judiciary, and policy
or expedient inquiry to the political process. Such an approach, I
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See Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv.

1093, 1098-99 (1982); PoweU, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087 (1982).
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believe, proves inadequate as a means to understanding or evaluating constitutional law. Issues do not divide easily along the lines
suggested. Even if they did, there is little reason to believe a priori
that the proposed institutional configuration would be superior.
The characteristics attributed to the judiciary seem, as generalizations, sensible, but the leap from these attributes to the functions
suggested is treacherous.
Dean Harry Wellington's work on constitutional theory spans
two generations. His earlier work with Alexander Bickel stands as
an important attempt to find a theory of judicial review that recognizes both the complexity of substantive decisionmaking and the
existence of problems in the legislative process.1 74 In his more recent work, he has argued that the judiciary should be assigned the
task of discovering principles derived from conventional morality.
He offers a distinction between the search for these principles and
the determination of policy, and associates these two tasks with a
general perception of institutional attributes:
If a society were to design an institution which had the
job of finding the society's set of moral principles and determining how they bear on concrete situations, that institution
would be sharply different from one charged with proposing
policies. The latter institution would be constructed with the
understanding that it was to respond to the people's exercise
of political power; in America, that means interest group
politics. The former would be insulated from such pressure. It
would provide an environment conducive to rumination, re17
flection, and analysis. 5
Reacting to criticism by Ely, 7 6 Wellington has restated his position, placing even greater emphasis on the shortcomings of the
political process:
The costs of uniting present and past should be acknowledged: our predecessors too were imperfect. Nevertheless, a
governmental structure that fails to unite a nation's present
with its past necessarily fails to preserve values to which its
citizens may attach considerable weight. It fails to make a
contemporary effort to understand what we have been or have
wished as a people to become, and thus it fails to give effect to
17' See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 18.
175 Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 246-47 (1973) (footnote omitted).
176 See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 63-64.
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what might be called the moral ideals of the community.
Those ideals cannot be understood by the bureaucracy, the
special pleaders, and the congressional staffers. Theirs is a
tunnel vision, and the tunnel vision of one is not offset by that
of the others. Nor would these ideals be given adequate voice
in a simple majoritarian government where the passionate and
self-interested concerns of the moment were too easily ac177
corded sovereignty.
Professor Michael Perry has recently presented a theory of the
role of judicial review in human rights cases that, like Wellington's,
stresses the reflective, contemplative, and neutral attributes of the
judiciary:
I will begin explaining my justification for noninterpretive
review in human rights cases with some fairly uncontroversial
observations about comparative institutional competence. In
recent generations, certain political issues have been widely
perceived to be fundamental moral issues as well-issues that
challenge and unsettle conventional ways of understanding
the moral universe and that serve as occasions for forging
alternative ways of understanding. In twentieth century
America there have been several such issues: distributive justice and the role of government, freedom of political dissent,
racism, sexism, the death penalty, and human sexuality. Our
electorally accountable policymaking institutions are not well
suited to deal with such issues in a way that is faithful to the
notion of moral evolution and, therefore, to our religious understanding of ourselves..
Executive and legislative officials tend to deal with fundamental political-moral problems, at least highly controversial
ones, when they confront such issues at all, by reflexive reference to the established moral conventions of the greater part
of their particular constituencies. They refuse to see in such
issues occasions for moral reevaluation and possible moral
growth.
Elected officials function that way principally because
for most of them few, if any, values rank as high as incumbency ....
Not that a concern for remaining in office is always inappropriate. That concern is of course what makes electoral ac77

Wellington, The Nature of JudicialReview, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 494 (1982) (footnote

omitted).
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countability work as well as it does to keep our representatives in tune with the polity. However, a concern for
remaining in office is not a particularly good way to keep faith
with the notion of moral evolution, which requires ongoing,
vigorous reevaluation of established moral conventions. Indeed, "[legislators have become astute at turning a deaf ear
to highly visible issues on which they do not want to gamble
their political lives." Over time, the practice of noninterpretive review has evolved as a way of remedying what would
otherwise be a serious defect in American government: the absence of any policymaking institution that regularly deals with
fundamental political-moral problems other than by mechanical reference to established moral conventions. 17 8
Perry's institutional approach is much like Wellington's. Both view
political officials as being substantially motivated by their self-interested wish to be re-elected. As a consequence, such officials are
"reflexive" decisionmakers, simply reacting to the desires and preferences of their constituents-desires and preferences that do not
necessarily accord with moral principles.
It is difficult at the outset to see how Wellington defines "principle" and "policy," or how those categories relate to any feasible
division of decisionmaking responsibility. Principle seems to refer
to basic precepts or constant general maxims. 179 Policy, by contrast, appears to be short-term and narrowly focused; it is more
expedient, more responsive to the needs of the moment. 8 ' Precisely what Perry means by the associated conceptions of moral
evolution and the "religious" sense of American self-understanding
is even more difficult to ascertain. He would probably admit that
the meaning is vague. I think he is attempting to capture what
each of us feels-that there is a sense of right and wrong which is
basic, albeit difficult to articulate and which evolves or changes
over time-and is employing this sense to define "moral issues.",8 ,
Whatever the uses for these distinctions elsewhere, they will
not serve as a sufficient guide to describe or evaluate the allocation
of societal decisionmaking. Even if there were a clear match between principle and the abilities of the judiciary, on the one hand,
178

Perry, NoninterpretiveReview in Human Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustification,

56 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 278, 293-94 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting Traynor, The Limits of
Judicial Creativity, 63 IowA L. R.v.1, 8 (1977)).
"' See Wellington, supra note 175, at 245-46.
110See id. at 237.
181 See Perry, supra note 178, at 283-93.
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and between policy and the abilities of the legislative process, on
the other (I will suggest that there is not), one is still left to divide
the real world between social issues that engage questions of "principle" or "moral evolution" and those that engage questions of
"policy" or "expediency."
Perry offers several examples of moral issues. In the passage I
have quoted, he lists distributive justice, political dissent, racism,
sexism, the death penalty, and human sexuality. These are obviously important social issues about which, with the possible exception of the first, the courts have had quite a bit to say. But is this
list of fundamental political-moral problems complete? Questions
of war and peace, which classically raise fundamental moral-political problems, are conspicuously absent from the list. Much of the
"political dissent" with which Perry is concerned has been related
historically to the moral and political justification of a given war or
even of war in general. The issue of nuclear war, its control, and its
meaning for national and international morality, for example, continues to strain our national sense of right and wrong as it has for
several decades. At least as a matter of description, however, Perry
could not list this issue because it is not one into which the judiciary has been much or often willing to intervene."8 2 As we have
seen, the courts have been reluctant to address questions of war
and peace even when racism has been involved.18 3 One might argue, of course, that such unwillingness to intervene reflects the fact
that the political process has generally handled questions of war
and peace well, but I can think of few arguments so likely to meet
with a skeptical response. One might ultimately conclude that the
political branches may be best suited to decide these issues, but
their history of war-related decisions is nevertheless far from ideal.
The shortcomings of the distinction offered by Wellington and
Perry are evident even when one focuses on matters that seem
quintessentially within the legislative responsibility. It is difficult
to pick out many important issues which do not involve basic principles or weighty moral issues. Control of unemployment and inflation, expenditures on health and education, immigration policy,
control of the environment, and the location and quantity of housing are but a few of the issues that engage questions of principle
and basic values. Yet, as a general matter, responsibility for these

182 See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (denying certiorari in suit seeking
a declaratory judgment that American military actions in Vietnam were unconstitutional).
283 See supra text accompanying notes 64-82 (discussing Korematsu v. United States,

323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
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issues lies with the legislative process. The judiciary has played no
role in most of these decisions, a minor role in some, and a major
role in very few.
Whatever is meant, then, by issues of principle or morality,
there is no obvious correlation between these issues and the traditional allocation of decisionmaking responsibility between the judiciary and the political branches. Wellington and, especially, Perry
may wish to make major alterations in the allocation of decisionmaking authority, but, unless they wish to allocate virtually all decisions to the judiciary, they must better distinguish questions of
morality or principle from the presumably much larger set of questions controlled by the legislature.
Having observed this threshold difficulty in the theories of
Wellington and Perry, I now can turn to the institutional arguments they make. Assuming that one could or would want to make
a distinction between issues that engage questions of principle or
morality and those that engage questions of policy or expediency,
is it clear that the judiciary should be given primary responsibility
for the former?
Wellington and Perry argue that the judicial process is contemplative, disinterested, and neutral, i.e., it reasons. They see the
legislative process, by contrast, as driven by passion and self-interest. Legislators do not have the time, protection, and perhaps even
training to reason or contemplate. Of course, these are generalizations, but even if they were universally true, they would not in
themselves yield any institutional answers.
Contemplation, reasoning, dispassionate consideration, and
the desire to consider the long view are fine attributes. If voters
and their elected representatives consistently functioned in this
way, many defects in the legislative process might well be eliminated. But Wellington and Perry do not propose to make the legislature more contemplative; they propose to substitute a more contemplative judiciary for the legislature. Societal decisionmaking
thereby gains, to be sure, contemplation and reason, but it loses a
basic measure of public will, desire, and reaction available in the
legislative process.
The choice presented by Wellington and Perry is analogous to
the choice between central planning and a market allocation of resources. The actors in the market are self-interested. They can be
described as driven by passion, ignorance, and shortsightedness.
Consequently, the results of market allocation can fail to take account of important factors, thereby injuring third parties or even
the market actors themselves. These market imperfections provide
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the impetus for considering such alternative modes of allocating
resources as central planning.
In a system of central planning the actors are assumed not to
be short-sighted or self-interested; contemplation and reason in
service of the general public are supposedly the system's features.
But even if a central planning scheme fulfilled these ideals, it
would still be missing an important element. In the hurly-burly of
market activity, despite the shortsightedness and because of selfinterest, wants and desires are revealed. The information gained is
not just a shopping list of goods and services preferred. It puts
weights on these desires and provides a simple index-relative
prices-by which to assess relative demand. The actors in the market do not intend to produce this information or control their own
desires by variation in supply and demand. The affirmative features of the market-to the extent they exist-are by-products of
the interaction of self-interested people.
Though the market has serious defects or imperfections-as
does the political process-greater cottemplation, reason, and disinterestedness are not cost-free. If one abandons the market or the
political process, information about the wishes of the public as citizens, consumers, or moral individuals must be obtained in some
other manner."" It generally may be correct that moral truth,
moral evolution, and basic conventional morality are not faithfully
embodied in the output of the political process. To say as much,
however, is merely to recognize imperfection, which alone advances
discussion little in a world of only imperfect alternatives. The political process may be highly imperfect and yet still superior to any
other alternative as the instrument of society's moral evolution. 185
Perry and Wellington have extrapolated from a sensitive perception of individual moral evolution to a far more tenuous perception of aggregate moral evolution. That the judiciary is the social
institution with the characteristics closest to those associated with
better individual decisionmaking may explain its attractiveness to
these commentators. But they are not analyzing individual evolu-

I" For an excellent treatment of the shortcomings that derived from the substitution of
expertise for the political process in the Progressive Era, see Sandalow, The Distrust of
Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 446 (1981).
185 Perry's emphasis, and to a lesser extent Wellington's, on the intentions and motivations of individual actors may represent a common analytical fallacy. Political actors, like
market actors, may not intend to do good or to act efficiently or fairly, but to the extent that
we are concerned, not with their intentions but with the aggregate effects of those intentions, the end result might be the good sought, even if we suppose that the actors never
intended to do that good.
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tion and individual decisionmaking. They are analyzing societal
evolution and societal decisionmaking, and the judiciary has at
best a limited sense of the perceptions and feelings of the rest of
society. Personal introspection may be fine for personal decisions;
it may even be a better means of making some social decisions
than a severely defective political process, but it is not obviously
the best means-certainly not without regard to the degree and
kind of defect in the political process or without regard to the type
of issue or value involved.
There is some ambiguity in analyses, like Wellington's, that
rest upon the principle/policy distinction as to whether the distinction is meant as advice to the judiciary on how it should decide or
advice on whether it should decide. An inquiry into how judicial
decisions are, or should be, made is a perfectly legitimate analytical endeavor, but it is important to realize that such an inquiry
does not directly address the choice that must be made about
which institution, the judiciary or the political branches, is best
able to make a given decision. It may be that it is wiser for the
judiciary to decide what it decides on the basis of principle (longterm, traditional maxims) rather than on the basis of policy (predictions about the immediate, practical consequences of a decision
on the behavior of societal actors). To say as much, however, is not
to indicate that the judiciary is superior to the political branches
as the arbiter of principle. Again it is important to stress that reasoning, moral, judicial, or otherwise, is one means, but not the only
or necessarily the best means to manifest basic principles.
Perry and Wellington may be correct that greater neutrality
and, to a lesser extent, contemplativeness are attributes which
make the judiciary an attractive alternative in some settings. My
objections to their analyses arise from their belief that these advantages are general and determinative, and can themselves serve
as the basis for a correct allocation of institutional responsibility.
Once we understand clearly how the decisionmaking ability of the
political branches varies depending on the issue in question, it may
be appropriate to conclude that certain societal issues are best allocated to the judiciary for decision. But the attributes of the judiciary identified by Wellington and Perry do not alone provide a basis for such an allocation.
IV. THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL VALUES AND THE INTENT OF THE
FRAMERS: THE APPROACHES OF LAURENCE TRIBE AND RAOUL
BERGER

Institutional analysis is demanding; it requires care and effort
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and yields results slowly. There are two general strategies for constitutional analysis that seem at least partially to escape these difficulties. One emphasizes the search for fundamental values or
goals; the other emphasizes the intentions of those who framed and
ratified the particular provisions of the Constitution. Although
these positions are often seen as polar opposites, 8" they have one
important feature in common: both deny that comparative institutional analysis has a central role in constitutional law. It is important, therefore, to establish whether, and the extent to which, each
approach offers an adequate escape from the task of institutional
comparison.
A.

Fundamental Value Analysis

Most constitutional scholars see some role for the identification of values, interests or goals in constitutional analysis. I am no
exception. The question here is the extent to which the search for
fundamental values can explain or evaluate constitutional law
without recourse to institutional analysis.
Professor Laurence Tribe is the most outspoken critic of institutional analysis and of those who stray from the search for fundamental interests. Tribe's position may be observed most conveniently in a recent article in which he severely criticizes "processbased" constitutional theories in general and the theory of John
Hart Ely in particular. 18 7 Tribe argues that the essence of the Constitution lies in the substantive values it embodies rather than in
its institutional choices. He begins by pointing to three basic substantive values present in the Constitution, "[r]eligious freedom,
antislavery, [and] private property."'' 8 These values are embodied
in such provisions as the first amendment establishment and free
exercise clauses, the thirteenth amendment, and the contract and
compensation clauses.189
If the significance of these provisions is thus said to be substantive, then one is obliged to ask what it means to call something
substantive. Stating that the Constitution embodies a particular
value does not explain why that value is embodied in the particu,86See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 1, 43.
187 See Tribe, supra note 99, at 1063-65.
18 Id.
at 1067.
so Id. at 1065. With the possible exception of the compensation clause, Ely also concedes that these provisions manifest substantive commitments. See J. ELY, supra note 15, at
91-101. With respect to these clauses, Tribe and Ely find one of their few grounds for
agreement.
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lar form or determine its limits and its application in particular
instances. Take, for example, the compensation clause. 19 0 It is not
difficult to concede that this clause relates to the protection of private property. Yet, to identify the protection of private property as
a goal does not, by itself, carry the understanding of the compensation clause very far. Whatever one means by the protection of private property, it is difficult to evaluate or explain the clause without some consideration of the relative merits of alternative,
imperfect decisionmakers who may be assigned the task of protecting private property-without, in other words, some institutional
analysis.
Accepting for the moment Tribe's claim that the compensation clause embodies a choice to protect private property, one is
faced with the realization that there are many conditions under
which forcing the government to compensate an individual property owner could harm private property generally. One can easily
imagine the need to build a dam to protect private land from flood,
or a courthouse or police station to aid in the protection of legal
rights to physical assets. But such projects could be thwarted in
some circumstances by the costs associated with the requirement
to compensate. For example, if government were required to compensate every private interest that might suffer adverse economic
effect as a result of the creation of an improved highway route to
replace an old one, the cost of creating a more socially efficient
plan might be prohibitive-to the damage of all business, realty, or
other private interests that might stand to benefit from a more effective highway layout. As a general matter, since protection of private property can as often require the force of the state as its forbearance, it is by no means obvious that requiring the payment of
compensation by the government would always be the preferred
means to protect private property.
In fact, because the compensation clause has raised many
questions of interpretation, additional institutional complexity has
been added. The substantive issues of when, if, and to what extent
compensation is to be paid were not finally resolved by the particular wording of the fifth amendment. The judiciary has taken upon
itself a significant part in defining the scope of just compensation.
The compensation clause, then, has had the effect of removing an
important set of decisions from the legislative process and allocating them to the judiciary. How can one know a priori that control
190 "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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of the state through a complex scheme evolved by the judiciary
better protects private property than would an unencumbered legislature or a legislature controlled by more precise and definite
terms in the document itself? One can understand or justify removal of the compensation decision from the legislative branches
and its allocation to the judiciary only by considering the relative
abilities of these alternative institutions. If the nation were today
to sit as a new constitutional convention, and all agreed that protection of private property was paramount, would it opt for a fixed
definition of compensation that might be outrun by unanticipated
future events, thereby possibly disserving its goal of protecting private property? Would it allow the legislative process, or any part
of it, to make the compensation choices and risk the problems arising from majoritarian rule or other shortcomings of the political
process? Would it allow the judiciary to make these choices even
though it would generally not allow such an institution to make
such trade-offs? These institutional questions are central to our
notion of just compensation as a substantive right, and they are
not answered by simply postulating the protection of private property as a substantive goal.
The contracts clause' 91 raises similar questions. Again, one can
conceive of instances in which contracting, or "the ability to arrive
at binding agreements, 1 9 2 would be promoted by legislative action
that altered obligations or contracts. A significant and unexpected
shift in economic circumstances might make the fulfillment of contractual obligations inconsistent with the desires and expectations
of the parties and might create disincentives to contracting. Arguably, a common law court could deal satisfactorily with such a shift
by means of conventional damage remedies or the defenses of frustration and impossibility. Such judicial remedies, however, are
hardly perfect; they are expensive to both the litigants and society,
and they are subject to error. Undesirable performance, unwarranted outlays, and an element of risk could be the outcome of
making the institutional choice to rely solely on the judiciary.
Thus, one can imagine a situation in which legislation that released
parties from their obligations and offered some rough approximation of the resulting damages might improve the contracting process and the protection of private property.1 93 I would not argue
11 "No State shall... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
"2
103

J.ELY, supra note 15, at 92.
The Court confronted an issue of this sort in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
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that such a solution is desirable. My argument is that if the contracts clause forecloses such legislative action, it promotes the postulated substantive value only if important and not obvious institutional assumptions are made about the market, the judiciary,
and the legislative processes.
The religion clauses1 94 are susceptible to the same analysis.
Does it necessarily follow that forbidding congressional action on
religious grounds increases religious freedom, the value which
Tribe claims is embodied in those clauses? Even if the first amendment seems to enhance religious freedom by forestalling congressional interference, religious freedom may also be stymied by private individuals through violence, economic discrimination, or
threats of either. Under such circumstances, it is possible to imagine that government action could promote religious freedom by
equalizing the ability of the adversely affected groups to worship.195 Likewise, it is possible to imagine a religion so hateful of,
and demeaning to, other religions that its practice would deter the
practice of other religions. The totality of religious freedom might
be promoted by government action presumably precluded by the
existing constructions of the "free exercise" clause.
The religion clauses represent a sensible perception of a major
source of danger to religious freedom in the form of governmental
interference. The framers were no doubt influenced by the past excesses of government and it is wise to fear such excesses today. But
if the clauses are wise or sensible, and if they promote the goal
suggested, they are so and do so because of institutional factors.
Under other institutional assumptions, the religion clauses might
be inconsistent with religious freedom, just as the contracts and
compensation clauses might be detrimental to the protection of
private property.
Consideration of the religion clauses raises issues of more general import. Tribe finds importance in values associated with "per-

290 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1934), where it upheld a Minnesota depression-era statute authorizing
the judiciary to extend the period of redemption from mortgage foreclosure sales and to
require payment by the mortgagor of appropriate damages.
I" "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend I.
"I Congress has enacted analogous legislation to alleviate race and gender inequality.
See, e.g., Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 235,
373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982)); Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, §§ 7151,
7154(b), 80 Stat. 378, 523 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7204(b) (1982)); Equal Pay Act of
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982)); see also
supra note 116 and statutes cited therein.
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sonhood" or privacy. 196 Although the terms are vague, they seem to
be related to the ability of an individual to enjoy personal fulfillment through choices about sexual preference, the bearing of children, and general lifestyle. Unfortunately, Tribe, 9 7 and others who
have explored and described these values,"9 " have largely ignored
an important consideration-not surprisingly, an institutional consideration. They have not carefully considered who should decide
when an interference with personal fulfillment has occurred and
who should decide on its remedy.
There is no doubt that political entities are a potentially serious source of interference with personal fulfillment in the form of
sexual and lifestyle choice. As with religion, however, in matters of
personal fulfillment government is not the only source of serious
interference. Individuals or private groups are capable of interfering with these choices, and government action might provide the
best protection against such private interference. More importantly, perhaps, where there is substantial interaction among individuals, the ability of one person to adopt a given lifestyle or express himself or herself may affect, and be affected adversely by,
another's attempts to do so. Someone must define the limits beyond which one individual's lifestyle or self-expression becomes an
infringement on the lifestyles and self-expression of others. There
can be no "freedom" without some level of governmental or collective action.
Again, I am not arguing that the legislative branches are necessarily preferable to the judiciary in promoting these values. Such
a statement would require a more careful institutional comparison
than our present understanding allows. I am contending that to
characterize a value as societally important does not take us very
far in understanding or evaluating the constitutional assignment of
responsibility for implementing that value.
This observation brings me to the most general concern of
those who adopt the "substantive" position, namely, the concept of
"fundamental values" or "fundamental rights." Ely criticizes the
notion of fundamental values in the following terms:
[T]he list of values the Court and the commentators have
tended to enshrine as fundamental is a list with which readers
of this book will have little trouble identifying: expression, as'" See L. TRmE, supra note 33, at 886-90; Tribe, supra note 99, at 1069-72, 1075-77.
" See L. TRImE, supra note 33, at 886-90.
See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) and
material cited therein.
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sociation, education, academic freedom, the privacy of the
home, personal autonomy, even the right not to be locked in a
stereotypically female sex role and supported by one's husband. But watch most fundamental-rights theorists start edging toward the door when someone mentions jobs, food, or
housing: those are important, sure, but they aren't
fundamental.199

Ely simply dismisses such listmaking as beyond the capacity and
legitimate authority of the judiciary, a position I have already criticized as too sweeping.200 But an essential point remains: Why are
values such as expression and education arguably more fundamental than housing, food, jobs, and, one might add, peace and war?
The answer may lie in the institutional role served by the concept of "fundamental rights." In the present constitutional jurisprudence, a finding that legislation affects a fundamental right
tends to remove that issue from the legislative process and allocate
responsibility for its determination to the judiciary. 20 1 If housing,
jobs, food, commerce, taxation, national defense, and foreign affairs were declared "fundamental values," the judiciary would have
to take a serious hand in their effectuation.
These subjects are not excluded from the list of "fundamental
values" because they are unimportant. If anything, they are excluded because they are too important. More exactly, they are excluded because the relative institutional abilities of the legislative
process vis-a-vis those of the judicial process are thought to favor
the former. This observation is not meant to suggest that the legislative process is ideal or close to ideal as an arbiter of these questions, but only that, as a general matter, the judiciary is not
thought to be a superior arbiter and has, therefore, generally
stayed away from these subjects.
I have sounded two major themes here which need summary.
First, I have suggested a hypothesis about the meaning of fundamental rights, at least as that term is employed by the Court. It is
commonly stated that in constitutional decisionmaking one must
first inquire into the nature of the rights involved in a given issue
and from the result of that inquiry flows the institutional choice of
the appropriate decisionmakers: if the rights are fundamental then
the judiciary should closely scrutinize the actions of the political
1g9J. ELY,

supra note 15, at 59 (footnote omitted).
:0 See supra notes 119-41 and accompanying text.
301 See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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process, if not then the political process is allowed a fairly free
hand. I have argued that the converse is a more accurate portrayal
of the causal link between institutional choice and fundamentality-where there is greater perceived need for judicial scrutiny
then a right will be characterized as fundamental.
Second, and most important here, institutional choice and
comparison is a necessary part of any constitutional theory. The
recognition and isolation of a value or set of values is inadequate
or incomplete. Governmental interference is never the sole source
of danger to any value. Unconstrained individual choice is also always present as a source of danger. Whether the goal is protection
of private property, or the freedom to worship as one desires, or
the choice of lifestyle, or anything else, there are potential dangers
from other individuals which may call for governmental redress, as
well as potential dangers from the governmental interference itself.
Therefore, an inevitable question arises as to who should decide
when government interference is appropriate.
It seems self-evident that the Constitution is about substance.
I cannot conceive of the framers, founders, or ratifiers as interested
in running a social scientific experiment in democratic theory. The
preamble sets out substantive goals. One can add to and subtract
from this list of goals and attempt better to define its content.
Travel through the Constitution reveals, among others, interests in
religion, private property, slavery, equal treatment, defense, commerce, public works, taxation, just criminal proceedings and punishment, and the fair allocation of the franchise. Tribe, in other
words, is correct when he insists that the Constitution concerns
what it means to be an individual or a citizen.
But the Constitution reflects another self-evident reality-reality is not self-evident. Even if the goals reflected in the
Constitution could be better defined, ordered in some way, or
boiled down to a simple overriding value or goal-the apparent
purpose of a great deal of constitutional scholarship-we would
still be a long way from understanding what the Constitution is,
will be, or ought to be. Any goal or interest or set of goals or interests must be implemented by imperfect institutions in an uncertain and changing world. However we define what it means to be
an individual or a citizen in our society, we will have to give careful
consideration to the manner in which this individualness or citizenship is to be implemented, protected, and accommodated with
other demands.
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Interpretivism

Interpretivists or originalists maintain that the content of constitutional law should be determined by the intentions of the framers or ratifiers of the particular provisions of the Constitution. This
position is generally viewed as the polar opposite of the fundamental rights position,20 2 but, as I have noted, the two positions share
the view that comparison of institutions is largely irrelevant. If one
accepts the premise that the intention of the framers should control and that the historicalrecord clearly establishes their intention as to either substantive or institutional choices, the need for
an independent comparative institutional analysis is, in such instances, concededly reduced.
There are two well-established criticisms of the originalist
logic. The first takes the normative position that the present generation should not be entirely constrained by the intentions or understandings of a past generation. 20 3 The second invokes the inherent difficulty of determining or even defining collective intent.20 '
Many groups have figured in the making of the Constitution-framers, ratifiers, and citizens. Each group is itself an aggregation of individuals. How is one to know which among often conflicting views prevailed? Should heavier weight be given to the
comments of proponents or to those of opponents of a particular
provision? Should statements made in one context be weighed
more heavily than those made in another? What did silent participants intend? In particular, what did the voting public or the mass
of state legislators believe they were doing? The evidence at hand,
moreover, is often meager; discussion was not always extensive or
documented, and the documents have not always been preserved.
These points aside, it is important to see that even if the Constitution had been framed by one individual whose intentions were
clear, and even if contemporary decisionmakers felt themselves
completely bound by those intentions, the interpretivist approach
could not resolve today's cases without recourse to some external
criterion-whether it be moral philosophy, comparative institutional analysis, or tea leaves.
The interpretivist I have chosen for my analysis is Raoul Berger. In his much discussed book, Government by Judiciary,°5 Ber202

See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 1, 43.

203

See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 476-82 (1981).

204 See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L.
REV. 204, 229-34 (1980).
205 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
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ger argues that the records of the Thirty-Ninth Congress are detailed and extensive enough to establish solidly that the framers of
the fourteenth amendment did not intend that any of the clauses
of the first paragraph should provide rights to vote or rights to
enjoy racially desegregated public facilities, especially not schools.
To Berger, the record shows that these clauses were meant simply
to protect the civil rights of recently freed slaves and that, by civil
rights, the framers meant only the traditional common law rights
to contract for purchase and sale of labor and other assets, to have
access to the courts for enforcement of contracts and redress of
other potential civil injuries, and to receive equal treatment in the
enforcement of and the protection afforded by the criminal law.
The amendment and the Civil Rights Acts 208 it supported were a
reaction to the Black Codes passed by many of the former slave
states. The members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress thought these
codes severely reduced the ability of the former slaves to function
as free people. The debates make clear to Berger, however, that
Congress also reflected a significant amount of the "Negrophobia"
then gripping the populace. The record clearly shows, he argues,
that most members of Congress rejected the idea that the fourteenth amendment included voting and school desegregation
among the civil rights it protected."0 7
Some have criticized Berger's reading of the historical
sources, 20 8 but that is not the relevant issue here. Even if Berger's
reading of the historical record is correct, it does not by itself determine the outcome of the voting rights and school desegregation
cases decided in the twentieth century.
Let me make my point by the use of a simple parable. Suppose that a person owns land in a remote jungle-a jungle without
any means of communication. Some time in the past he visited this
land and surveyed its terrain and resources. Now he wishes the
land developed. Although he would prefer to oversee the task himself, he cannot make the trip. Instead, he appoints an agent and
gives her the following instructions. (1) Build a dam to control the
28 Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1971, 1981, 1987, 1989-1991 (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current
version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 1986-1987, 1989-1992 (1982)).
207 See R. BERGER, supra note 205, at 20-36, 52-68, 117-33, 166-214.
210 See, e.g., Kutler, Raoul Berger's FourteenthAmendment: A History or Ahistorical?,
6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511 (1979); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul
Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979); Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1752
(1978). For an extensive summary of the critiques of Berger and his replies, see Gangi, Judicial Expansionism: An Evaluation of the Ongoing Debate, 8 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 1 (1981).
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river which courses through the property. If the river is not controlled, the development operations such as mining and timbering
cannot be carried out. (2) Construct the dam of materials on the
site. There are several kinds of trees on the land which should provide more than sufficient material to build the dam. (3) Do not use
two of the types of trees-teak and rosewood-in constructing the
dam. These trees are valuable and should be kept for other
purposes.
With these instructions, the agent sets out to develop the remote land. When she arrives, she finds that the river is more powerful and less controlled than when the landowner had visited. She
also finds that the supply of trees other than teak and rosewood
has diminished significantly since his visit. The agent attempts to
build a dam from these other trees, but the flooding is only partially controlled and the timbering and mining are not fully protected. In fact, as time goes by, the makeshift dam seems increasingly inadequate to control the flooding and protect the mining
and timbering operations, which are becoming more extensive and
complex. Eventually, it appears to the agent that any realistic success at mining and timbering requires greater protection from
flooding than can be achieved except by using the forbidden teak
and rosewood trees on the dam. The agent is faced with an obvious
quandary. Lacking direct recourse to the landowner, she has only
his words to rely on-words uttered with reference to a conception
of the task that no longer conforms to circumstances as they actually exist.
The framers of the fourteenth amendment sought to protect
what they thought to be key civil rights. In their view, such rights
did not include voting or desegregation. Yet, after more than one
hundred years, the post-World-War-II Court might well believe
that the basic civil rights that the Thirty-Ninth Congress intended
to protect had not in fact been secured by such means as the Civil
Rights Acts. Fear of state authorities, indifference by federal authorities, and perhaps ignorance among the populace effectively
denied blacks the rights that were in theory secured to them by
the fourteenth amendment. The problems thought inherent in the
Black Codes seemed present in other laws and practices, and these
obstacles had not been removed or controlled by access to direct
legal action under the Civil Rights Acts.
The situation in the mid-twentieth century is no doubt more
complex than this account suggests, but it would not be unreasonable even for an interpretivist judge to have observed a failure to
achieve the goal of the fourteenth amendment-the protection of
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those basic civil rights necessary for a person to function in society
as a free individual. Such a judge might seriously consider the need
for different steps-even those once forbidden by the framers-in
order to carry out the framers' mandate. Better education, the interaction of the races in schools, and more meaningful access to the
vote are plausible means for securing real access to basic civil
rights in the face of a century of hostility and indifference. The
interpretivist judge would be faced with conflicts between the
mandate to secure basic civil rights and the framers' apparent prohibition on federally mandated integration of public facilities or
enfranchisement of blacks.
But I have not completed my parable. If the landowner is the
analogue to the framers, then, consistent with my earlier discussion, the agent is really a set of future decisionmakers-not just
the judiciary. Thus, to return to the parable, the landowner might
have sent several agents to develop the land. But now there must
be some indication of which tasks are to be carried out by which
agent. What are the instructions on the allocation of tasks in Berger's version of the fourteenth amendment? In particular, who is to
resolve the conflict between the basic mandate and the specific
prohibitions?
The underlying distrust of state governments inherent in the
fourteenth amendment reduces their claim as primary candidates
for the task, leaving us with two alternatives-Congress and the
judiciary. Here Berger might well argue that the framers showed a
clear preference. Section five of the fourteenth amendment provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." 20 9 By Berger's own reading of the record, however, that provision presumed that the protection of basic civil rights could be accomplished by the means
that seemed acceptable at the time-the Civil Rights Acts. Would
the same allocation of tasks have occurred if the inadequacy of
those Acts had been foreseen? The members of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress may well have trusted themselves to resolve unforeseen
conflicts between mandates and prohibitions. But the conflict did
not surface in its present form in 1868. The appropriate question
for an interpretivist must be whether the members of the ThirtyNinth Congress would have chosen twentieth-century Congresses
over twentieth-century courts or even the modern state legislatures
to resolve a conflict that, at the time the fourteenth amendment
20, U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
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was adopted, did not appear to be major.2 10
Thus, when an interpretivist judge seriously considers the conflict between the fourteenth amendment's mandate to protect civil
rights, on the one hand, and the framers' desires to avoid interference with state control of voting and separation of the races, on
the other, he or she must also consider how the framers intended
that such a conflict be resolved. The relationships among Congress,
the courts, and the states must have been considered in some
rough sense in 1868. Presumably, allocation of institutional roles
was a product of those perceptions-including the perception that
the civil rights in question could and would be secured sufficiently
and quickly by congressional action. There have been shifts in that
perception as well. The interpretivist judge, like the agent-overseer, arrives at his or her remote place in time to find conditions
significantly different and his or her basic instructions in conflict.
Someone must attempt to resolve these conflicts. Perhaps the record is clear enough to resolve these conflicts by reference to the
intent of the framers. It does not look so to me.
Interpretivists like Berger concede that the Constitution
leaves many gaps which require future decisionmaking and, more
importantly, future allocation of decisionmaking responsibility.
Once one notices, however, the difficulty of matching perceived
goals and the institutional mechanisms for their realization over
long periods, the concession seems to give away the game.2 11
210 Berger himself notes that the first section of the fourteenth amendment was enacted
in fear of actions by subsequent Congresses. See R. BERGER, supra note 205, at 23. As a
general matter, the interpretivist judge may have trouble finding determinate institutional
answers in most constitutional contexts. When the framers of the Constitution set out to
achieve goals and set conditions, they did so under conditions likely to make them appreciate not only that institutions are limited, but also that allocations of decisionmaking authority among institutions are likely to be unstable over time. In his excellent work on the evolution of political thought in the period between the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, Gordon Wood describes
significant shifts in perceptions of how best to allocate institutional responsibility in order
to achieve the goals envisioned by the founders. See G. WooD, supra note 155, passim.
These shifts revealed deep uncertainty about the constitutional forms and institutional allocations suited to the needs of the new republic. It is difficult to believe that those who
framed or ratified the original Constitution were committed to a firm and fixed institutional
allocation projected into the indefinite future if, in little more than a decade, perceptions
about institutional allocation had changed so dramatically and remained so controversial.
"I There are two additional reasons why the originalist position is limited as a mode of
constitutional analysis. First, the originalists do not supply us with any means to describe
constitutional law as it has developed in this century. Second, even if the originalists abandon description and seek solely to reform constitutional law, they must nevertheless face
serious institutional questions that they have not adequately addressed.
One purpose of constitutional analysis is to achieve a greater understanding of the law
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CONCLUSION

I am told that Mark Twain often began his talks with a dramatic pause, followed by the announcement: "Aristotle is dead.
Plato is dead. Goethe is dead. Nietzche is dead. And I don't feel so
well myself. '2 12 1recognize that this is an introductory piece which
can only serve the purpose of presenting the outlines of comparative institutional analysis and of clearing the way for its expansion
and testing. Like the approaches I have criticized, the approach I
as it exists. Berger, however, eschews any descriptive role for the originalist approach. Berger believes that many major decisions of this century are inconsistent with the intent of the
framers. He seems to recognize that there is virtually no jurist who has ever consistently
toed the originalist line. See R. BERGER, supra note 205, at 56-98 (reapportionment cases),
249-82 (substantive due process cases), 338-50 (Burger Court death-penalty cases), 397-406
(Burger Court trial-by-jury decisions). While no theory of constitutional analysis can claim
to provide a wholly accurate description of actual decisionmaking, the originalist position
seems especially ill-suited to the task.
The second problem is related to the critical stance taken by authors like Berger. If, as
Berger argues, judges always have proclaimed adherence to the intent of the framers and
have then violated their proclamations in practice, one must doubt the prescriptive as well
as the descriptive power of the originalist approach. If, despite pronouncements before and
after appointment, judges stray, then how might they be stopped? The originalists must
present a means of implementing their reform at some acceptable cost.
Education and exhortation spring first to mind. But original intent is not a concept
about which judges are unaware; many judicial arguments are framed in precisely such
terms. Nor are judges so unable to comprehend or search out original intent that reform can
come simply by showing them the way. According to Berger, some of the prime examples of
research into original intent have come from the pens of judges (or their clerks) and have
been ignored by their fellow judges.
Another possibility for implementing the originalists' program is to work through the
appointment process, seeking to seat more originalist judges. It is my impression, however,
that Presidents have tried to follow such a course and have found their predictions of adherence to originalism to be quite unreliable.
As one looks beyond the appointment power, the reforms become increasingly expensive. Congress-if it could be convinced of the virtues of original intent-might remove jurisdiction from the Court in areas where there has been serious transgression, assuming that
Congress has such power and could identify such instances. But such a step may itself violate the framers' original intention of employing the Court as a negative check on Congress.
In addition, the reallocation would have to be severe if it were aimed at stopping a determined judiciary. What the judiciary cannot do by constitutional review, it can often do by
statutory interpretation. Imposing limits on those powers threatens to reform the judiciary
away.
So far as I understand, originalists do see a role for judicial review and the invalidation
of legislation on constitutional grounds. Perhaps because they are legal scholars long imbued
with the notion that the judiciary plays an important role in the constitutional scheme, if
only in its common law role as an administrative arm of the legislature, the originalists
would likely wish to stop significantly short of a massive reduction of the judicial role. But,
in order to elevate their critique into reform, they must face the institutional questions of
how and at what cost greater adherence to original intent will come.
212My source here is my colleague Willard Hurst. Should, by chance, the story be apocryphal, we may at least assume it is the sort of thing Twain would have said.
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suggest has its limits and no doubt'its defects.
It is my belief that a comparative institutional approach to
constitutional law will yield important intellectual returns for both
positive and normative analysis. I have examined some important
constitutional cases to show that relevant institutional factors
seem essential to understanding and evaluating them, and have examined the approaches of others to extract general lessons about
institutional analysis and its relevance.
I am aware that a few applications and a look at the gaps in
existing approaches do not establish the superiority of the comparative institutional approach. Only the criticism of others, including, I hope, the commentators I have discussed, can prove the mettle of the approach suggested here. If comparative institutional
analysis is to be advanced and tested, time and effort must be expended on careful studies of specific constitutional questions. I
hope that I have begun to lay the basis for such studies, and for
intellectual interchange about the role of institutional comparison
in constitutional law.

